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DISMANTLING COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES: THE
CASE FOR ABOLISHING ILLINOIS’ CRIMINAL
NAME-CHANGE RESTRICTIONS
INTRODUCTION
Two women, Meagan and Tanya, walk into a Chicago office of the
Department of Human Services (DHS) to apply for the Illinois Sup-
plemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), formerly known as
“food stamps.”1  Meagan is a cisgender woman2 and Tanya is a trans-
gender woman.3  Each woman is assigned a caseworker who inter-
views them to determine their eligibility and asks them to produce
1. See Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program—Snap (Dec. 28, 2015), ILL. DEP’T HUM.
SERVS., https://www.dhs.state.il.us/page.aspx?item=30357 (last visited Mar. 4, 2017).  This hypo-
thetical is based on real-world situations that the author witnessed while working at the Trans-
formative Justice Law Project of Illinois for the past six years.  The author has worked closely
with transgender people who are living in poverty and criminalized.  The actual names of the
individuals and the particular facts of each case have not been used to protect confidentiality.
2. The term cisgender (commonly shortened to “cis”) refers to a person who identifies with
the gender they were assigned at birth. LGBTQ+ Definitions, TRANS STUDENT EDUC. RES.,
http://www.transstudent.org/definitions (last visited Jan. 17, 2017).  For example, a cisgender
woman is a person who was assigned female at birth and currently identifies as female.  On a
related note, this Comment uses the terminology “gender as assigned at birth” rather than, for
example, the phrases “birth gender” or “a person who was born male” because it is more socially
accepted and less offensive among transgender people.  Many transgender people feel that they
have actually been the gender with which they currently identify their entire lives, and were
merely assigned the wrong gender at birth. Id.  Further, this phraseology highlights the notion
that gender is not an anatomical and immutable fact, but rather something that is socially con-
structed and non-consensually assigned to people based on their anatomy as perceived at birth.
Nobody is “born male” or “born female”; people become gendered when the doctor says “it’s a
boy!” or “it’s a girl!” Id. See generally JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE
SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY (Linda J. Nicholson ed., 1990); ANNE FAUSTO-STERLING, SEXING THE
BODY: GENDER POLITICS AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF SEXUALITY (2000); NOBODY PASSES: RE-
JECTING THE RULES OF GENDER AND CONFORMITY (Mattilda a.k.a Matt Bernstein Sycamore
ed., 2006); Christin Scarlett Milloy, Don’t Let the Doctor Do This to Your Newborn, SLATE:
OUTWARD (June 26, 2014, 11:44 AM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/outward/2014/06/26/infant_
gender_assignment_unnecessary_and_potentially_harmful.html.
3. The term transgender (commonly shortened to “trans”) refers to a person who identifies
with a gender different from the gender they were assigned at birth, including people who iden-
tify as transsexual, gender non-conforming, cross-dressers, drag kings and queens, genderqueer,
and more. Transgender Terminology, NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUAL. (Jan. 15, 2014),
http://www.transequality.org/issues/resources/transgender-terminology.  While the statute that is
the subject of this Comment impacts all people seeking to change their legal names—including
transgender women, transgender men, and cisgender people—the criminal restrictions contained
in the statute disproportionately impact transgender women of color living in poverty.  For this
reason, this Comment will primarily focus on circumstances particular to the lives of transgender
647
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their government-issued identification cards.4  Meagan hands her state
ID to her caseworker.  It reads “Meagan Wilson,” shows a photo of a
woman with long hair and identifies her as “Female.”  Her application
is processed and she is eventually granted SNAP benefits.
Tanya then hands her state ID to her caseworker.  It identifies her
as “Female” and displays a picture of the longhaired woman sitting in
front of the caseworker, but the name reads “Thomas Williams.”  The
caseworker accuses the woman of using someone else’s ID and at-
tempting to defraud the government.5  When Tanya explains that she
is transgender, the caseworker proceeds to ask invasive questions
about her genitalia, her identity, and her reasons for seeking SNAP
benefits.  The caseworker refuses to process the application until
Tanya brings in her “real ID.”  Frustrated and dejected, Tanya walks
out and her application is never processed.
The next day, Tanya interviews for a position at a fast food restau-
rant.  Her resume reads “Tanya Williams,” which is the name she gives
the manager who interviews her, and at no point does the manager
questions her name or gender.6  The interview goes well, and later
that day she receives a call from the manager saying the company
would like to hire her.  Company policy, in accordance with federal
employment law, requires that prospective employees bring in two
forms of government-issued identification and then fill out paperwork
with required information like legal name, social security number, and
contact information, among other things, before the company can for-
women, and uses a fictionalized transgender woman in the opening paragraphs to illustrate the
impacts of the statute.
4. Apply for Cash, SNAP (Food Stamps) & Medical Assistance, ILL. DEP’T HUM. SERVS.,
http://www.dhs.state.il.us/page.aspx?item=33698 (last visited Jan. 17, 2017) (explaining that ap-
plying for food or medical assistance requires documents proving identity, residence, Social Se-
curity numbers, and other types of documents depending on the circumstances).
5. This is an example of transphobia.  Transphobia refers to discrimination, fear, hatred, or
violence directed toward transgender people on the basis of their gender.  Common examples of
transphobia include invasive questions about a trans person’s genitalia and accusations that they
are “lying” about their gender. LGBTQ+ Definitions, supra note 2. R
6. This is an example of passing.  The term “passing” commonly refers to when a transgender
person’s gender expression is “read” consistent with their gender identity (e.g., when a trans-
gender woman is read as a woman). LGBTQ+ Definitions, supra note 2.  “Gender expression” R
refers to how people outwardly express their gender to the world through things like manner-
isms, voice, hair, and clothing, while “gender identity” refers to a person’s internal sense of being
a woman, man, neither, or both. Transgender Terminology, supra note 3.  Everybody, whether R
they are transgender or cisgender, has a gender expression and a gender identity, and both may
change multiple times throughout a person’s lifetime, or even from day to day. Id.; Understand-
ing Gender, GENDER SPECTRUM, https://www.genderspectrum.org/quick-links/understanding-
gender/ (last visited Jan. 11, 2017).
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mally complete the hiring process.7  Excited, Tanya brings them her
state ID card and social security card.  On the paperwork, she uses the
name “Tanya Williams” and checks the “Female” box.  The human
resources representative looks at her documents, and asks Tanya why
she “didn’t tell them her real name was Thomas,” the name on her
state ID and social security card.  Tanya attempts to explain that she is
transgender and has not been able to legally change her name, and the
human resources representative just nods silently, avoiding eye con-
tact.  Later, Tanya receives a phone call from the human resources
representative saying that the company was rescinding her employ-
ment offer.  She suspects it is because her documents outed8 her as
transgender to the human resources representative.
One might wonder why Tanya did not simply change her name on
her state ID and social security card if it causes her so many
problems.9  Tanya was not eligible to change her legal name because
four years prior, she was convicted of class-four felony Retail Theft.
In Illinois, a person with any felony conviction is barred from chang-
ing their10 legal name until ten years after the termination of their
sentence, and certain convictions, both felony and misdemeanor, cre-
7. I-9, Employment Eligibility Verification: Purpose of Form, USCIS, https://www.uscis.gov/i-9
(last visited Mar. 7, 2017).
8. In this context, “outing” refers to a non-voluntary disclosure of one’s transgender identity.
LGBTQ+ Definitions, supra note 2; see also Tips for Allies of Transgender People, GLAAD, R
http://www.glaad.org/transgender/allies (last visited Jan. 17, 2017).
9. While many transgender people want to change their names, many also retain their former
names, or choose not to change their legal names to reflect their new names.  There are many
reasons for this.  Many transgender people prefer to use names depending on the setting, or even
the day of the week.  Others might use different names or pronouns depending on the situation
for safety reasons, for example if they do not feel safe being “out” as transgender to certain
family, friends, or co-workers.  These are all legitimate expressions of transgender identity, and
each person’s gender self-determination should be respected. See TRANSFORMATIVE JUSTICE
LAW PROJECT OF ILL., TRANSGENDER 101: A QUICK GUIDE ON BEING AN ALLY TO PEOPLE
WHO ARE TRANSGENDER AND GENDER NON-CONFORMING (2013), http://tjlp.org/wp-content/
uploads/2013/04/Transgender-101-download.pdf [hereinafter TRANSGENDER 101].  Out of re-
spect for transgender people’s autonomy, this Comment does not advocate that all transgender
people should change their legal names, even if it might appear to some people that doing so
could promote safety and reduce incidents like in the hypothetical situation described here.  This
Comment focuses on the criminal name-change restrictions and their relation to trans communi-
ties because of the large proportion of transgender people who want to change their legal names
and whom this statute negatively impacts.
10. This Comment intentionally uses “they” as a singular pronoun, rather than using the
phrase “he or she,” which reflects a widely accepted practice among transgender communities.
Id.  The reason transgender communities have adopted this grammatical practice is that the
phrase “he or she” is binary and is not inclusive of the pronoun choices of many transgender
people who identify outside of the gender binary. Id.  An important aspect of life as a trans-
gender person is to ask that others respect their self-determination over how others refer to
them, and “he or she” is not inclusive and even offensive to many transgender people. Id.;
Davey Shlasko, How Using ‘They’ as a Singular Pronoun Can Change the World, FEMINISTING
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ate permanent bars to changing a legal name.11  This Comment refers
to those clauses of the statute as “the ten-year wait period” and the
“permanent name-change restrictions,” respectively, and refers to
them collectively as the “criminal name-change restrictions.”  This is
not the only law of its kind in the United States, but Illinois’ name
change felony wait period is by far the longest in the country, and only
six other states have permanent bars.12  Taken together, these restric-
tions have a profound impact on transgender people throughout
Illinois.
One such impact concerns transgender people—particularly trans-
gender women of color—who are disproportionately criminalized and
targeted by the police.13  Some studies estimate that 47% of Black
transgender people, 30% of Native American transgender people,
25% of Latinx transgender people, 13% of Asian transgender people,
and 12% of white transgender people can expect to be arrested at
some point in their lives.14  These discrepancies are a result of racist
and transphobic policing, as well as disproportionate rates of poverty
and homelessness among these demographics.15  Due to the dispro-
portionate rates of criminal convictions among transgender people, Il-
linois’ name-change statute could potentially prevent roughly six
thousand transgender people in Illinois from changing their legal
names on their identity documents.16
(2015), http://feministing.com/2015/02/03/how-using-they-as-a-singular-pronoun-can-change-the-
world/.
11. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/21-101 to -105 (2014).
12. See infra notes 114–48 and accompanying text (providing comparison of name-change R
laws across all fifty states).
13. Criminal Justice? New Fast Facts About Transgender People, Police, and Incarceration,
FORGE, http://avp.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/FORGE_Trans_People_Police_Incarcer
ation_Facts.pdf (last visited Jan. 11, 2017); see also ANTI-VIOLENCE PROJECT, HATE VIOLENCE
AGAINST TRANSGENDER COMMUNITIES, https://avp.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/ncavp_trans
hvfactsheet.pdf (last visited Jan. 11, 2017).  This Comment primarily focuses on how transgender
women of color are impacted by the criminal name-change restrictions because transgender
women of color are disproportionately criminalized compared to white transgender people or
transgender men of all races, this Comment will focus primarily on how transgender women of
color are impacted by the criminal name-change restrictions.
14. JAIME M. GRANT ET AL., INJUSTICE AT EVERY TURN: A REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
TRANSGENDER DISCRIMINATION SURVEY 163 (2011), http://www.thetaskforce.org/static_html/
downloads/reports/reports/ntds_full.pdf.
15. See infra notes 151–91 and accompanying text (explaining how disproportionate rates of R
poverty and police targeting among transgender people of color leads to disproportionate rates
of arrest and incarceration).
16. There is no existing data on exactly how many transgender people in Illinois are impacted
by the criminal name-change restrictions.  Claire Miller, The Search for the Best Estimate of the
Transgender Population, N.Y. TIMES, (June 8, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/09/upshot/
the-search-for-the-best-estimate-of-the-transgender-population.html?_r=0.  Based on the au-
thor’s first-hand experience helping petitioners change their legal names, the author knows, an-
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Additionally, in the age of the War on Terror, the United States has
increased surveillance and scrutiny of both identity documents and
criminal history in virtually every aspect of daily life: housing, educa-
tion, employment, public benefits, and transportation—just to name a
few.17  This trend has had an impact on transgender people in particu-
lar.18  Nationally, forty-one percent of transgender people are living
with a government identification card that does not match their pre-
ferred name and gender identity.19  When a transgender person’s pre-
ferred name and gender presentation do not “match” the legal name
on their identity documents, they become more vulnerable to
transphobic violence and discrimination in the areas of employment,
housing, education, law enforcement, correctional facilities, and other
institutions that require proof of identification.20  Of the reported inci-
dences, forty percent of transgender people who presented an identifi-
cation card that does not match their gender identity or gender
expression were harassed, three percent were physically attacked, and
ecdotally, of hundreds of trans people in Chicago alone who have been denied a name change
based solely on the basis of their criminal history.  A very rough estimate of transgender Illi-
noisans impacted is 6000.  This number derives from one study that estimates approximately
0.51% of adults in Illinois identify as transgender; putting the potential transgender population
in Illinois at around 49,750, compared to the national transgender population of 1,397,150. AN-
DREW R. FLORES ET AL., THE WILLIAMS INST., HOW MANY ADULTS IDENTIFY AS TRANS-
GENDER IN THE UNITED STATES? 3 tbl.1 (2016), http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/
uploads/How-Many-Adults-Identify-as-Transgender-in-the-United-States.pdf (using data from
2014).  Nationally, about sixteen percent of transgender people report having spent time in jail
or prison. GRANT ET AL., supra note 14, at 163.  This percentage is likely higher in large metro- R
politan areas like Chicago because of the greater overall population.  The higher concentration
of transgender people, combined with hyper-policing, results in higher incarceration rates for
this population.  Assuming that sixteen percent of trans people in Illinois have been incarcer-
ated, potentially 8024 transgender people in Illinois have criminal records.  However, some of
those people may have been incarcerated and never convicted (e.g., incarcerated pending trial).
Some have convictions that do not subject them to any criminal name-change restrictions, and
some of them were, at one time, subject to the wait period that has since elapsed after the
termination of their sentences. See id. at 5; see also 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/21-101.  Further,
some of those trans people with criminal records do not want to change their legal names. See
TRANSGENDER 101, supra note 9.  Therefore, for purposes of this Comment, the final estimate of R
trans people in Illinois who are subject to the criminal name-change restrictions is 6000.
17. Dean Spade, Documenting Gender, 59 HASTING L.J. 731, 731–39 (2008).
18. Id.
19. GRANT ET AL., supra note 14, at 5. R
20. See TRANSFORMATIVE JUSTICE LAW PROJECT OF ILL., QUICK GUIDE TO THE CRIMINAL-
IZATION OF TRANSGENDER AND GENDER NON-CONFORMING PEOPLE (2013), http://tjlp.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/04/Quick-Guide-to-the-Criminalization-of-Transgender-and-Gender-Non-
Conforming-People-download.pdf [hereinafter QUICK GUIDE]; see also DEAN SPADE, NORMAL
LIFE: ADMINISTRATIVE VIOLENCE, CRITICAL TRANS POLITICS, AND THE LIMITS OF THE LAW 144
(2011).
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fifteen percent were asked to leave the premises of the employer, bus-
iness, or wherever they presented their identification card.21
While Illinois law does not prohibit people with criminal convic-
tions from changing their legal gender markers—there exists a sepa-
rate name-change process for each identity document, which usually
require a letter from a medical doctor or a mental health professional
rather than a court order22—transgender people like Tanya can just as
easily be outed on the basis of their name alone.23  Those who have
the resources sometimes feel compelled to move to different states
that do not have criminal name-change restrictions, leaving behind
their support systems in Illinois solely in order to change their legal
names.24
This Comment argues for completely eliminating the ten-year wait
period and the permanent bars from Illinois’ name-change statute.
Criminal history should be considered irrelevant for the purpose of
changing one’s legal name, and when a state prohibits someone from
changing their legal name on that basis, the state violates the Four-
teenth Amendment’s Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, as
well as the First Amendment’s Freedom of Speech Clause.  Even
more, it is harmful public policy.  The Illinois criminal name-change
restrictions arbitrarily and substantially interfere with the First
Amendment’s grant of freedom of expression, which this Comment
argues should include the right to control one’s name.  These restric-
tions have a disproportionately negative impact on transgender peo-
21. GRANT ET AL., supra note 14, at 5. R
22. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/21-101; Legal Resources for Transgender and Gender Variant,
HOWARD BROWN HEALTH CTR., http://howardbrown.org/programs-services/transgender-health/
legal-resources/ (last visited Jan. 17, 2017) (detailing the processes for changing one’s gender
marker on an Illinois state ID, driver’s license, and birth certificate).
23. See infra notes 358–62 (illustrating a case in which a transgender woman was harassed and R
denied access to a restaurant on the basis of her legal name on her state ID); see also QUICK
GUIDE, supra note 20 (discussing how transgender people can be outed on the basis of their legal R
name alone regardless of their legal gender marker).
24. QUICK GUIDE, supra note 20.  As a transgender woman and activist, the author of this R
Comment is personally invested in interrupting these patterns, and has seen them play out all
too often.  Since 2010, the author has been working as a Collective Member at the Transforma-
tive Justice Law Project of Illinois (TJLP), a prison abolitionist organization that provides free,
holistic legal services and non-legal advocacy to transgender people in Chicago and throughout
prisons in Illinois.  Who We Are, TRANSFORMATIVE JUST. L. PROJECT ILL., http://tjlp.org/about/
who-we-are/ (last visited Jan. 17, 2017).  TJLP hosts a monthly Name Change Mobilization
where attorneys and trained volunteers help transgender people file petitions to change their
legal names.  Name Change Mobilization, TRANSFORMATIVE JUST. L. PROJECT ILL., http://
tjlp.org/services/name-change-mobilization/ (last visited Jan. 17, 2017).  In the author’s ongoing
work at TJLP, she has seen countless transgender people face discrimination and violence as a
consequence of Illinois’ criminal name-change restrictions.
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ple of color, and they cannot be justified by any compelling state
interests.
Part II begins by providing an overview of the historical develop-
ment of name change laws in general, Illinois’ name-change statute,
and name-change laws in other states.25  Part II also provides back-
ground information on criminal justice trends in the United States—
particularly as they relate to transgender people—in order to situate
criminal name-change restrictions within the larger context of laws
that disproportionately target marginalized groups.26  Part II con-
cludes with an overview of the Constitutional doctrines relevant to
arguments to abolish Illinois’ criminal name-change restrictions.27
Part III argues that the criminal name-change restrictions should be
abolished because they violate the First Amendment Freedom of
Speech Clause, the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, and
the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause.28  Additionally,
this Part argues that the restrictions should be abolished because they
create practical inconsistencies with Illinois sealing laws and are a part
of an insidious trend of mass incarceration.29
Part IV discusses the potential legal and policy implications of re-
moving considerations of criminal history from Illinois’ name-change
statute, including the impact on transgender people, survivors of do-
mestic violence, and overall community safety.30
Part V concludes that abolishing Illinois’ criminal name-change re-
strictions is necessary to ensure that transgender people, and others
who need to change their legal names, are afforded the safety, sup-
port, and resources that they deserve.
II. BACKGROUND
This Part provides an overview of Illinois’ criminal name-change re-
strictions and other background information that may be relevant in
arguments to abolish them.  Section A provides a brief history of
name change laws leading up to the adoption of Illinois’ criminal
name-change restrictions, and then compares those restrictions to
25. See infra notes 34–148 and accompanying text.  This Comment focuses on the process for R
changing one’s legal name in Cook County, Illinois—where Chicago is located.  Cook County is
the largest metropolitan area in the state and likely has the highest density of transgender people
out of any other county in Illinois.
26. See infra notes 149–91 and accompanying text. R
27. See infra notes 192–297 and accompanying text. R
28. See infra notes 301–462 and accompanying text. R
29. See infra notes 463–519 and accompanying text. R
30. See infra notes 523–68 and accompanying text R
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name-change statutes in other states.31  Section B provides an over-
view of criminal justice data and trends, particularly with regards to
transgender people.32  Section C is an overview of constitutional
amendments that may be relevant in arguments to abolish the crimi-
nal name-change restrictions.33
A. Overview of Name Change Laws
While names themselves have existed throughout human history,
name-change statutes are a relatively new phenomenon, and criminal
restrictions on legal name changes have only existed for about twenty
years.  This Section begins by describing the historical development of
name-change statutes in general.34  It then provides an overview of
Illinois’ name-change statute, and illustrates the name-change process
in Illinois using the process in Cook County as an example.35  This
Section concludes with a comparison of name-change statutes in other
states.36
1. The Evolution of Name Change Laws
For the vast majority of human history, changing one’s name was
very simple, and the numerous hurdles that exist today were only re-
cently enacted.37  At common law, people were afforded almost un-
limited flexibility in naming themselves.38  Surnames did not exist in
Anglo naming traditions until the fourteenth century, and they were
initially chosen at random based upon physical, mental, or moral char-
acteristics, occupations, or even resemblance to particular animals.39
There were no laws governing name changes.40  In England, surnames
did not become static and transferrable to descendants until the six-
teenth century, but one could still assume a new name without peti-
tion to the state.41
Anglo-American legal systems did not adopt name-change statutes
until the early twentieth century.42  They adopted name-change stat-
31. See infra notes 34–148 and accompanying text. R
32. See infra notes 149–91 and accompanying text. R
33. See infra notes 192–297 and accompanying text. R
34. See infra notes 37–58 and accompanying text. R
35. See infra notes 59–113 and accompanying text. R
36. See infra notes 34–148 and accompanying text. R
37. Julia Shear Kushner, Comment, The Right to Control One’s Name, 57 UCLA L. REV. 313,
325 (2009).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 324–25.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 325.
42. Id. at 328.
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utes contemporaneously with identity documents as part of a larger
endeavor to keep more detailed records of their residents.43  Before
the widespread adoption of government-issued identity documents in
the early twentieth century, Churches were the primary keepers of
vital records like birth and death dates.44  Petitioning the court for a
name change was unnecessary because few people were required to
have official identity documents displaying their legal names.45  Iden-
tification cards emerged for three state purposes: colonization, crime
control, and war.46
Identification systems in the United States were at first only applied
to specific oppressed segments of the population.47  For example,
some of the first government-issued IDs in the United States were
slave passes, which listed the name, occupation, and government-as-
signed number of the enslaved person.48  By the turn of the twentieth
century, the government relied more on ID cards for the purposes of
war and crime control.49  The United States adopted national citizen
registration systems in the early twentieth century for the purposes of
identifying citizens for the draft, tracking international travelers, and
identifying potential enemies of the state on the basis of their country
of origin.50  In fact, most people in the United States did not have any
government-issued identity documents like ID cards, passports, or
birth certificates until they became mandatory for travel and other
purposes during World War I.51  Around the same time, states
adopted fingerprinting technology and began cross-referencing crimi-
nal records with identity documents in order to capture people with
outstanding arrest warrants when they presented their IDs to institu-
tions.52  Thus, states adopted name-change statutes just as they began
to rely on identity documents in order to more easily identify, surveil,
include, exclude, police, and punish their residents.53
43. DAVID LYON, IDENTIFYING CITIZENS: ID CARDS AS SURVEILLANCE 22–23 (2009).
44. See Elizabeth Crabtree Wells, Church Records, in THE SOURCE: A GUIDEBOOK TO AMER-
ICAN GENEALOGY (Loretto Dennis Szucs & Sandra Hargreaves Luebking eds., 2006).
45. See Kushner, supra note 37, at 325–26 (explaining that name-change statutes emerged in R
tandem with other state efforts to track their residents).
46. LYON, supra note 43, at 22. R
47. Id. at 21.
48. Id. at 27–28.
49. Id. at 30–34.
50. Id. at 33–35.
51. Id. at 34–35.
52. LYON, supra note 43, at 30–33. R
53. Id. at 23.
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These identification laws and documents did not restrict one’s free-
dom to name oneself any more than the common law tradition.54  In
fact, when states first enacted name-change statutes, they generally
retained the common law right to change one’s name without petition
to the state, so long as that person consistently used the new name for
a sufficiently long period of time.55  Thus, the purpose of name-change
statutes was to assist states in keeping more detailed records and to
codify and supplement the common law tradition, not replace or re-
strict it.56
Today, every state has adopted statutes governing name changes,
and while most have not explicitly abrogated the common law avenue
for changing one’s name, in practice the only way to change one’s
name on government documents is to petition the court through the
established statutory scheme.57  Illinois has explicitly abrogated the
common law avenue, and without petitioning the court for a legal
name change, Illinois residents cannot change their names on their
government-issued identification cards, or with their employers,
banks, schools, insurance companies, and other institutions with which
they must interact on a daily basis.58
2. Overview of the Illinois Name-Change Statute
Illinois’ statute that governs name changes (not including marital
and adoptive name changes) was originally passed in the early twenti-
eth century to supplement and codify the common law tradition of
changing one’s name.59  Currently, Illinois law mandates that in order
for a petitioner to change their legal name, they must be (1) an Illinois
resident, and (2) a resident of the county of filing for at least six
months by the time they file their petition.60  Further, people under
eighteen are considered minors and cannot file on their own.61  An
order may be entered for a minor only if the court finds by clear and
convincing evidence that the change is “necessary to serve the best
54. Kushner, supra note 37, at 325–26. R
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/21-105 (2014) (“Common law name changes adopted in this State
on or after July 1, 2010 are invalid.”); see also TRANSFORMATIVE JUSTICE LAW PROJECT OF ILL.,
NAME CHANGE 101: CHANGING YOUR LEGAL NAME IN COOK COUNTY, IL, http://tjlp.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/04/NameChange101_2016.pdf (last visited Aug. 13, 2016) [hereinafter
NAME CHANGE 101].
59. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/21-101 to -105; see Reinken v. Reinken, 184 N.E. 639, 640 (Ill.
1933).
60. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/21-101.
61. Id.
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interest of the child.”62  By contrast, an order is entered for an adult if
the court finds “no reason why the prayer should not be granted.”63
Generally, a petitioner satisfies this standard if the name change is not
sought for the purpose of fraud, or to avoid adverse judgments or
debts.64
The Illinois name-change statute currently states, “any person con-
victed of a felony in this State or any other state who has not been
pardoned may not file a petition for a name change until 10 years have
passed since completion and discharge from [their] sentence.”65  Be-
yond a mandatory waiting period, the Illinois legislature chose to in-
clude a list of several convictions that permanently disqualify a person
from changing their legal name in Illinois:
[As of January 1, 2007, a] person who has been convicted of identity
theft, aggravated identity theft, felony or misdemeanor criminal sex-
ual abuse when the victim of the offense at the time of its commis-
sion is under 18 years of age, felony or misdemeanor sexual
exploitation of a child, felony or misdemeanor indecent solicitation
of a child, or felony or misdemeanor indecent solicitation of an
adult, or any other offense for which a person is required to register
under the Sex Offender Registration Act in this State or any other
state who has not been pardoned shall not be permitted to file a
petition for a name change in the courts of Illinois.66
When it was first enacted around the turn of the century, Illinois’
name-change statute did not contain any of these restrictions; it was
not until almost a century later, in 1993, that the Act was amended to
include the name-change criminal restrictions.67  On March 2, 1993,
then State Representative Tom Dart (current Cook County Sheriff
Dart) proposed 1993 H.B. 967 (Public Act 88-25), which provided for
a two-year name-change waiting period, beginning from the termina-
tion of a felony sentence.68  It passed unanimously and went into ef-
fect July 6, 1993, and the two-year waiting period remained in effect
for approximately three years.69
In 1995, the Illinois General Assembly set out to create harsher
penalties for sex offenses, and by the end of the legislative session
they had passed a number of criminal and civil procedure laws in this
62. Id.
63. Id.; see Kushner, supra note 37, at 334. R
64. Kushner, supra note 37, at 334. R
65. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/21-101.
66. Id.
67. H.B. 967, 88th Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 1993).
68. Id.
69. Id.
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area, including three amendments to the name-change statute.70  The
first change to the name-change statute came in 1996 with S.B. 146
(Public Act 89-192), which expanded the two-year name change fel-
ony waiting period to include misdemeanor sexual offenses: “misde-
meanor criminal sexual abuse when the victim of the offense at the
time of its commission is under 18 years of age, misdemeanor sexual
exploitation of a child, misdemeanor indecent solicitation of a child,
or misdemeanor indecent solicitation of an adult.”71  These were the
first convictions to be specifically enumerated in the statute.72  The
General Assembly presumably added these misdemeanors to the
name-change statute because convictions for these crimes required
sex offender registration with local police for ten years under the Ha-
bitual Child Sex Offender Registration Act of 1986, and legislators
wanted to prevent registered sex offenders from changing their legal
names and avoiding registration requirements.73  The law passed
unanimously and went into effect January 1, 1996.74
In 1996, H.B. 3670 (Public Act 89-462) created stricter requirements
surrounding the Sex Offender Registry and sex offender community
notification procedures.75  The 1996 Sex Offender Registration Act
created a public database of sex offenders, provided for a maximum of
ten years on the Registry for people convicted of various sex offenses
(including the offenses enumerated in the name-change statute), and
required registered sex offenders to notify neighbors before they
move into a neighborhood.76  A portion of the Act also amended the
70. State Representative Daniels stated:
We’ve paid attention to our families and making sure that child killers and sex offend-
ers notify their neighbors when they are in the neighborhood or are put away perma-
nently in jail without any opportunity of getting back on the street. . . .  A mother in Mt.
Vernon knows her children will be better protected against child sex offenders and
killers. . . .  Yes, we promised and we delivered.
H.R. Debate Transcript, 89th Gen. Assemb., 138th Leg. Day, at 209–12 (Ill. May 24, 1996) (state-
ment of Rep. Daniels).  These policy concerns also reflected trends in the national Congress and
in state legislatures across the country, who were writing into law sex offender registries, com-
munity notification laws, sexually violent predator laws, and more. See Georgia Harlem, Unjust
and Ineffective, ECONOMIST, Aug. 6, 2009, http://www.economist.com/node/14164614.
71. S.B. 146, 89th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 1995).
72. See H.B. 967, 88th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 1993) (containing no enumerated
convictions).
73. See Michelle Olson, Putting the Brakes on the Preventive State: Challenging Residency Re-
strictions on Child Sex Offenders in Illinois Under the Ex Post Facto Clause, 5 NW. J.L. & SOC.
POL’Y 403, 410 n.61 (2010) (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, ¶ 222 § 2(B) (1987)).
74. S.B. 146, 89th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 1995).
75. H.B. 3670, 89th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 1996).
76. Id. § 120(c).
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name-change statute to increase the name-change wait period from
two years to ten years.77
The longer waiting period originated because some legislators were
concerned that a person convicted of a sex offense could evade the
ten-year sex offender registration requirement by changing their legal
name after completing the two-year name change waiting period.78
“What we found out is that you have to register under [the] Sex Of-
fender Registration Act for 10 years, however you could change your
name in two, thereby circumventing the intention of the Sex Offender
Registration Act.”79  That concern was based on the perceived limits
of technology and police procedures at the time; as one House Repre-
sentative remarked,
Police agencies track convicted felons by name and date of birth.  If
a convicted felon changes his or her name, police agencies would
not be able to determine his or her criminal record.  The Child Sex
Offender Law requires sex offenders to register with local police
agencies.  If a defendant legally changes his or her name, the defen-
dant could live in the area and no one would know of their criminal
background.80
H.B. 3670 passed unanimously and went into effect on June 1, 1996.81
The final change to the name-change statute came in 2007 with H.B.
4179 (Public Act 94-944), which established the lifetime bar to chang-
ing one’s legal name for those convicted of sex crimes against chil-
dren, indecent solicitation of an adult, identity theft, aggravated
identity theft, and any crime requiring sex offender registration.82
These sex crimes were added to the permanent bar in tandem with
legislation that created permanent sex offender registration require-
ments for the same sex crimes.83  The identity theft crimes, which had
never been part of the statute until 2007, were included in the perma-
nent bar as part of a more comprehensive effort to combat the grow-
77. Id. § 2(c-5).
78. See H.R. Debate Transcript, 89th Gen. Assemb., 110th Leg. Day, at 107 (Ill. 1996) (state-
ment of Rep. Pedersen).
79. Id. at 109 (statement of Rep. Hoffman).
80. Id. at 107 (statement of Rep. Pedersen).
81. H.B. 3670, 89th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 1996).
82. H.B. 4179, 94th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2007).
83. Id.
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ing problem of identity theft crimes.84  The bill passed unanimously
and went into effect January 1, 2007.85
After these three bills passed, the Illinois name-change statute con-
tained the most restrictive barriers to accessing a legal name change in
the country.86  These name-change restrictions are divided into three
components: (1) the ten-year wait period based on felony convictions;
(2) the permanent bars based on sex crime convictions; and (3) the
permanent bars based on identity theft convictions.87
3. Filing a Name Change Petition in Cook County, Illinois
As an example of how this statute is applied today, this sub-section
outlines the process for changing an adult’s legal name88 in Cook
County, Illinois.89  Changing one’s name in Cook County takes ap-
proximately three months, and costs a total of $533.90  A petitioner
must either pay the fees or petition the county court for a fee waiver.91
If the fee waiver is granted or if the petitioner does not require a fee
waiver, they must then complete and file the following documents:92
84. See H.R. Debate Transcript, 110th Leg. Day, 94th Gen. Assemb., at 101 (Ill. 2006) (state-
ment of Rep. Schock) (“[Senate] Bill 2554 is a piece of legislation dealing with identity theft.  It
is a compilation of several ideas . . . .”); see also id. at 88 (statement of Rep. Pihos) (“[I]dentity
theft ranks as the fastest growing crime in this nation with more than 11 thousand cases occur-
ring in Illinois in 2004.”).
85. H.B. 4179, 94th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2007).
86. See infra notes 34–148 (illustrating cross-state comparison of name-change criminal re- R
striction statutes).
87. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/21-101 to -105 (2014).
88. This process does not apply to changing one’s gender marker on identity documents,
which does not require petition to the court. See Driver’s License / State ID Card, OFF. ILL.
SECRETARY STATE, http://www.cyberdriveillinois.com/departments/drivers/drivers_license/
drlicid.html#gender (last visited Mar. 5, 2017).
89. The Cook County model was selected to illustrate the name-change process in Illinois
because it contains the State’s largest city, Chicago, and thus is accessed by more people than the
other counties in Illinois. Illinois Cities by Population, ILL. DEMOGRAPHICS, http://www.illinois-
demographics.com/cities_by_population (last visited Jan. 17, 2017). Based on those numbers,
Chicago should have a higher population of transgender people than other counties, and a
higher percentage of the general population is living with criminal convictions, which suggests
that most people who are impacted by the criminal name-change restrictions live in Cook
County.  The process varies only slightly from county to county, and the Cook County process
illustrates the same general process used in other parts of the state. See QUICK GUIDE, supra
note 20. R
90. See NAME CHANGE 101, supra note 58; see also A Guide to Procedures in Change of Name R
Proceedings, ST. ILL., CIR. CT. COOK COUNTY (2015), http://www.cookcountycourt.org/ABOUT-
THECOURT/CountyDepartment/CountyDivision/ChangeofNameProceedings.
91. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/21-101; see NAME CHANGE 101, supra note 58. R
92. NAME CHANGE 101, supra note 58. R
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(1) the Name Change Petition;93 (2) the Judgment form;94 and (3) the
Cover Sheet.95  The petition asks for the petitioner’s current legal
name, the new name that the petitioner would like, residency, age,
and “any felony or misdemeanors for which the petitioner has been
convicted in Illinois or in any other state.”96  Additionally, the petition
includes an affidavit verifying that all of the information contained in
the petition is true and correct, which must be signed by a witness.97
Finally, the cover sheet requires the petitioner’s current legal name
and contact information.98  Petitioners who do not have a fee waiver
must pay a $359 filing fee.99  Once the petitioner has filed, they will be
assigned a court date that is usually eight weeks from the date of
filing.100
After filing the petition, the petitioner must publish their intent to
change their legal name in a newspaper for a minimum of three con-
secutive weeks.101  In Cook County, petitioners customarily publish
notice of their intended name change in the Chicago Daily Law Bulle-
tin.102  The petitioner must provide the Chicago Daily Law Bulletin
with one copy of the petition (not including the affidavit), the court
date, time, name of judge, courtroom, case number, and a publication
fee of $165, unless the petitioner has a fee waiver.103  The Chicago
Daily Law Bulletin will then publish the petitioner’s notice for three
consecutive weeks and then mail the petitioner a Certificate of
Publication.104
Finally, the petitioner must attend their court date before a County
Judge with their Certificate of Publication, Judgment form, Petition,
and Identity Documents.105  At this hearing, the judge asks the peti-
93. CLERK OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR COOK CTY., ILL., PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME,
http://12.218.239.52/Forms/pdf_files/CCCON039.pdf (last visited Jan. 17, 2017) [hereinafter PETI-
TION FOR CHANGE OF NAME].
94. CLERK OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR COOK CTY., ILL., JUDGMENT ORDER, http://
12.218.239.52/Forms/pdf_files/CCCO0038.pdf (last visited Aug. 9, 2016).
95. CLERK OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR COOK CTY., ILL., COVER SHEET, http://12.218.239.52/
Forms/pdf_files/CCCO0520.pdf (last visited Jan. 17, 2017) [hereinafter COVER SHEET].
96. PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME, supra note 93. R
97. Id.
98. COVER SHEET, supra note 95. R
99. NAME CHANGE 101, supra note 58. R
100. A Guide to Procedures, supra note 90. R
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. NAME CHANGE 101, supra note 58.  Petitioners who qualify for a fee waiver can have the R
publication fee waived. Id.
104. Public Notice, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., https://www.lawbulletin.com/legal/public-notice-net-
work (last visited Sept. 6, 2016).
105. A Guide to Procedures, supra note 90. R
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tioner their reasons for seeking a name change, as well as questions
regarding criminal history.106  While the judge does not run criminal
background checks, petitioners risk the penalty of perjury if they fail
to disclose criminal convictions that would subject them to criminal
restrictions.107  The judge then uses this information to determine
whether to grant or deny the name change.108  The judge may deny
the petition if the petitioner is absent, if the petitioner does not bring
all of the required documents, or if the judge believes the petitioner is
seeking a name change for the purpose of fraud or to avoid debts or
adverse judgments.109
If the judge determines that the name change is consistent with the
public interest and that the petitioner does not have a conviction that
would subject them to any of the criminal name-change restrictions,
the judge must grant the name change and sign the petitioner’s court
order.110  Upon receiving approval from the judge, the effect of the
name change is not automatic; the petitioner must provide a copy of
those court orders to every institution that maintains a record of the
petitioner’s legal name, including the Department of Motor Vehicles,
Social Security Administration, Department of Vital Records, Depart-
ment of Human Services, banks, schools, employers, creditors, and in-
surance companies.111  Each institution has its own procedure for
changing names and may charge fees;112 however, once a person has
obtained this court order, all institutions and other states must respect
that person’s name change.113
4. Name Change Law in Other States
Illinois’ name-change statute is substantially similar to name-change
statutes in other states, with the exception of the name-change crimi-
nal restrictions.  In all states, an adult114 petitioner’s name change pe-
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.; see 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/21-101 (2014).
110. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/21-101.
111. See Legal Resources for Transgender and Gender Variant, HOWARD BROWN HEALTH
CTR., http://howardbrown.org/programs-services/transgender-health/legal-resources/ (last visited
Jan. 17, 2017) (detailing the processes for changing one’s gender marker on an Illinois state ID,
driver’s license, and birth certificate).
112. Id.
113. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (“Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the Public
Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State.”).
114. This Comment will not discuss name changes for minors because they entail very differ-
ent rules and policy considerations than adult name changes. See Kushner, supra note 37, at 329 R
n.88.
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tition is granted if: (1) the court115 determines that the name change is
consistent with the public interest;116 (2) the court finds that the peti-
tioner has valid reasons for seeking a name change;117 (3) the peti-
tioner is a resident of the state;118 and (4) the petitioner publishes
notice of their name change for a number of weeks.119  Generally,
courts presume a name change to be consistent with the public inter-
est if it is done for the reason of marriage, divorce, or adoption.120
Further, in every state, anyone may object to a name change for any
reason, and judges may consider those objections when determining
whether granting the name change would be consistent with the public
interest.121  Finally, in all states, if a name change petitioner is re-
115. In at least two states (Alabama and North Carolina), name changes are granted or de-
nied by clerks and petitioners do not go before a judge. See ALA. CODE § 12-13-1(b)(10)
(Westlaw through Act 2017-277 of the 2017 Reg. Sess.); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 101-5 (West,
Westlaw through S.L. 2017-9 of the 2017 Reg. Sess.).  In Hawaii, the Lieutenant Governor has
the sole authority to hear name change petitions. See HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 574-5 (West,
Westlaw through Act 15 of the 2017 Reg. Sess.).
116. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 68.07 (West, Westlaw through 2017 1st Reg. Sess.); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 210, § 12 (West, Westlaw through ch. 9 of the 2017 1st Ann. Sess.); MO.
ANN. STAT. § 527.270 (West, Westlaw through legislation effective as of March 30, 2017); 54 PA.
STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 702 (West, Westlaw through Act 1 of the 2017 Reg. Sess.).  Some
states use the terms “good or sufficient reason,” “reasonable cause,” and “not detrimental to the
interests of any other person.”  Kushner, supra note 37, at 330 & n.90.  The analysis is roughly R
equivalent for each standard: a name change should be granted if it is not done for the purpose
of fraud, to harm others, or to avoid debts or adverse judgments. Id. at 334.
117. See, e.g., 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/21-101 (2014); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-8-101 (West,
Westlaw through legislation effective as of Apr. 17, 2017); WASH. R. GRANT DIST. CT. LCRLJ
65 (West, Westlaw through legislation effective as of Aug. 15, 2016).  In some states, the peti-
tioner bears the burden of proving sufficient reasons for changing their names before their peti-
tion is granted; in other states, name-change statutes require the judge to grant the petition in
the absence of any compelling reason to the contrary.  Kushner, supra note 37, at 333. R
118. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-2-101 (West, Westlaw through legislation effective as of
May 4, 2017); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2501 (West, Westlaw through legislation effective as of Apr.
24, 2017); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1402 (West, Westlaw through legislation effective as of Apr. 27,
2017); 54 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 702; TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-8-101; VA. CODE
ANN. § 8.01-217 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 786.36 (West,
Westlaw through 2017 Act 6).
119. See, e.g., 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/21-103; GA. CODE ANN. § 19-12-1 (West, Westlaw
through Act 139 of the 2017 Leg. Sess.), amended by 2017 Ga. Laws Act 222; N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 40-8-2 (West, Westlaw through ch. 137 of the 53d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess.). But see, e.g., MICH.
COMP. LAWS. ANN. § 711.3 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 2017, No. 33 of the 2017 Reg. Sess.).  In
some states name change petitioners are not required to publish notice if doing so would put that
person in danger, for example if the petitioner proves they are a victim of stalking. See, e.g.,
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1277(a)(5) (West, Westlaw through ch. 9 of 2017 Reg. Sess.) (stating
that petitioners changing their name for purposes of gender transition are exempt from publica-
tion requirement).
120. HAW. REV. STAT. § 574-5; 54 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. Ann. § 704; VA. CODE ANN.
§ 20-121.4.
121. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 5901(c)(2) (West, Westlaw through ch. 10, 81 Laws
2017); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-12-2; MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-31-202 (West, Westlaw through legis-
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quired to register as a sex offender, either the petitioner or the court
that granted the name change must notify law enforcement after the
name change takes effect.122
Beyond these general requirements, each state falls into one of
three categories with respect to how it treats non-incarcerated name
change petitioners who have criminal convictions.123  These categories
are detailed below, starting with the least statutorily restrictive ap-
proach (Group A) and proceeding to the most statutorily restrictive
approach (Group C).
In Group A, consisting of thirteen states, petitioners are not statu-
torily required to disclose their criminal history during name change
proceedings, and judges are not statutorily required to consider crimi-
nal history when determining whether to grant the name change.124
Group A states do not expressly forbid judges from inquiring about
lation effective as of April 21, 2017); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 33-22-28 (West, Westlaw through
ch. 542 of the Jan. 2016 Sess.); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-37-9 (Westlaw through legislation effec-
tive as of Apr. 13, 2017).
122. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-21,271 (Westlaw through legislation effective as of
May 11, 2017); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 7-805 (West, Westlaw through 1st Reg. Sess. of the 64th
Leg.); MD. CODE ANN., RULE § 15-901 (West, Westlaw through legislation effective as of Feb. 1,
2017); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-19-302(a)(i) (West, Westlaw through legislation effective as of Mar.
17, 2017), amended by 2017 Wyo. Laws ch. 144.
123. These categories do not take account of whether the state permits name changes of incar-
cerated people because such policies entail different considerations.  Some states in Groups A,
B, and C permit name changes for incarcerated people under certain circumstances. See, e.g.,
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 5901; LA. STAT. ANN. § 13:4751(D) (Westlaw through 2017 First Ex-
traordinary Sess.); N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 61 (McKinney, Westlaw through 2017 N.Y. Laws ch.
58); In re Cruchelow, 926 P.2d 833, 834–35 (Utah 1996) (holding that incarceration status is not a
substantial reason to deny a name change petition from a prisoner in the state department of
corrections, absent evidentiary support).  Other states in all three categories expressly prohibit
name changes for incarcerated people. See, e.g., TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 45.103 (West, Westlaw
through ch. 8 of the 2017 Reg. Sess.); In re Verrill, 660 N.E.2d 697, 699 (Mass. App. Ct. 1996)
(holding that a prisoner’s name change petition should be denied because it had the potential to
cause confusion in his criminal records); Brown v. Wyrick, 626 S.W.2d 674, 679 (Mo. Ct. App.
1981) (holding that granting a name change to a prisoner would be detrimental to the adminis-
tration of the penal system).
124. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 84 (Westlaw through Apr. 15, 2017); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2501
(West, Westlaw though  Apr. 24, 2017); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-12-1; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1402
(West, Westlaw through legislation effective as of Apr. 27, 2017); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 401.030
(West, Westlaw through  2017 Reg. Sess.); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 210, § 12 (West, Westlaw
through ch. 9 of the 2017 1st Ann. Sess.); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-17-1 (West, Westlaw through
legislation effective as of Apr. 18, 2017); MO. ANN. STAT. § 527.270 (West, Westlaw through
legislation effective as of March 30, 2017); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-31-101; NEB. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 25-21, 271; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-8-1; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-37-5; WYO. STAT. ANN.
§ 1-25-101.  Petitioners in Maine are not statutorily required to disclose criminal history, but
probate judges have discretion to order a background check and use the results to determine
whether the name change is consistent with the public interest. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-a
§ 1-701 (Westlaw through ch. 47 of the 2017 1st Reg. Sess.)
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criminal convictions and do not have any permanent bars or waiting
periods.125
In Group B, consisting of twenty-nine states, petitioners must sub-
mit to either a mandatory criminal background check, or they must
disclose on their petitions if they have ever been convicted or are fac-
ing pending charges for a felony or certain enumerated crimes, or they
must disclose if they are currently required to register as a sex of-
fender.126  Criminal convictions are considered relevant in determin-
ing whether the name change is consistent with the public interest, but
they do not create a permanent bar, and they do not initiate a name
change waiting period.127  In some Group B states, the court of filing
sends notice of the petitioner’s name change to law enforcement or to
125. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 84 (2015); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2501; GA. CODE ANN. § 19-12-1;
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1402; KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 401.030; MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 210,
§ 12; MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-17-1; MO. ANN. STAT. § 527.270; MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-31-101;
NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-21, 271; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-8-1; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-37-5;
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-25-101. But see, ME. STAT. tit.18 § 1-701 (Westlaw through ch 47 of the
2017 1st Reg. Sess.).
126. ALA. CODE § 15-20A-36 (Westlaw through Act 2017-277 of the 2017 Reg. Sess.); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-601 (Westlaw through  legislation effective as of May 3, 2017); ARK. CODE
ANN. § 9-2-101 (West, Westlaw through  legislation effective as of May 4, 2017); CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE § 1279.5(d) (West, Westlaw through ch. 9 of 2017 Reg. Sess); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 13-15-101(1)(b) (West, Westlaw through legislation effective as of Apr. 18, 2017); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 52-11 (West, Westlaw through legislation effective as of May 16, 2017); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 10, § 5901; D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2501 ( West, Westlaw through Apr. 24, 2017); HAW.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 574-5; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 7-804; IND. CODE ANN. § 34-28-2-3 (West,
Westlaw through legislation effective as of Apr. 18, 2017); MD. CODE ANN., Rule 15-901 ; MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 711.1(1)–(2) (West, Westlaw through P.A. 2017, No. 33 of the 2017 Reg.
Sess., 99th Leg.); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.13(a) (West, Westlaw through  legislation effective as
of May 13, 2017); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41.290-3 (West, Westlaw through legislation effective
as of Mar. 30, 2017); N.H. CIR. CT. FAM. DIV. § 9.4 (Westlaw through legislation effective as of
Apr. 15, 2017); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:52-1 (West, Westlaw through 2017 Laws, ch. 66); N.Y. CIV.
RIGHTS LAW § 61-1(a); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 101-5 (West, Westlaw through S.L. 2017-9 of the
2017 Reg. Sess.); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 32-28-02 (West, Westlaw through legislation effective
as of May 3, 2017); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1631 (West, Westlaw through ch. 302 of the 2017
1st Reg. Sess.); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33.420 (West, Westlaw through ch. 21 of the 2017 Reg.
Sess.) (some counties require disclosure of prior convictions), amended by 2017 Oregon Laws
H.B. 2673; R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 33-22-28; S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-49-20(A)(1), (4) (Westlaw
through 2017 Act No. 14); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 45.103(a)–(b); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.15, § 817
(West, Westlaw through Law No. 10 of the 2017 1st Sess.); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-217-D (West,
Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.); WASH. R. GRANT DIST. CT. LCRLJ 65 (Westlaw through
Aug. 15, 2016); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 301.47 (West, Westlaw through 2017 Act 6).
127. ALA. CODE § 15-20A-36; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-601; ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-2-102;
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1279.5(d); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-15-101; CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 52-11; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 68.07 (West, Westlaw through 2017 1st Reg. Sess.); HAW. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 574-5; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 7-804; IND. CODE ANN. § 34-28-2-3; MD. CODE ANN.,
Rule 15-901; MICH. COMP. LAWS § 711.1; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.13(a); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 41.290; N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 32-28-02; N.H.  CIR. CT. FAM. DIV. § 9.4 (Westlaw through
legislation effective as of Apr. 15, 2017); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:52-1; N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 61-
1(a); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 101-5; OKLA. STAT. tit. 12 § 1631; S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-49-20;
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\66-2\DPL214.txt unknown Seq: 20  7-JUL-17 11:03
666 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:647
the prosecutor that obtained the conviction, and the prosecutors and
police are given an opportunity to object to the name change.128  In
other Group B states, law enforcement, prosecutors, and courts are
only notified after the name change has been granted, for record
keeping purposes.129  In some Group B states, petitioners must dis-
close convictions but notice is never sent to law enforcement.130  In
two Group B states, Michigan and North Dakota, petitioners with fel-
ony convictions are presumed to be changing their names for fraudu-
lent purposes, and the petitioner has the burden of rebutting that
presumption.131  Finally, in some Group B states, people who are re-
quired to register with the Sex Offender Registry are prohibited from
changing their legal names until they are no longer required to regis-
ter, at which point they become eligible to change their legal names.132
In Group C, consisting of nine states, including Illinois, petitioners
with certain convictions are permanently barred from changing their
legal names, and in some Group C states petitioners with felony con-
victions are subject to a mandatory waiting period before they become
eligible to change their names.133  In Tennessee and Ohio, petitioners
with convictions for murder or sex crimes are permanently barred
from changing their names, but there are no waiting periods.134  In
Louisiana, petitioners previously convicted of a “crime of violence”
are permanently barred from changing their name, and petitioners
with all other felony convictions are eligible to change their names
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 45.103; VT. STAT. ANN. tit.15, § 816; VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-217 (West,
Westlaw 2016); WASH. R. GRANT DIST. CT. LCRLJ 65; WIS. STAT. ANN. § 301.47.
128. ALA. CODE § 15-20A-36; COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-15-101; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 52-11; IND. CODE ANN. § 34-28-2-3; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.13; TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 45.103; VT. STAT. ANN. tit.15, § 817; WASH. R. GRANT DIST. CT. LCRLJ.
129. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:52-1 (West, Westlaw through  2017 Laws, ch. 66); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 15-49-20.
130. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 574-5; NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41.290-3.
131. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 711.1; N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 32-28-02.
132. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-25-107 (West, Westlaw through legislation effective Mar. 14,
2017); WIS. STAT. ANN. 301.47 (West, Westlaw through 2017 Act 6). But see CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE § 1279.5(d) (stating that the court may not grant name change of person required to regis-
ter as sex offender unless it determines that doing so is in the best interest of justice and would
not pose a public safety risk); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 817 (note that Vermont’s Sex Offender
Registry is notified and given an opportunity to object, but sex offender registration is not a per
se bar to changing one’s name).
133.  LA. STAT. ANN. § 13:4751(D) (Westlaw through 2017 1st Extraordinary Sess.); 735 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5/21-101 (2014); 54 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 702 (West, Westlaw through
2017 Reg. Sess. Act 1); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-8-101 (West, Westlaw through Apr. 17, 2017);
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 45.103; W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-25-103.
134. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2717.01 (West, Westlaw through 2017 File 5) (establishing a
permanent name change restriction for identity fraud convictions); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-8-
101.
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immediately upon terminating their sentences for those felonies.135  In
Pennsylvania, the waiting period expires two years after completion of
the petitioner’s felony sentence, and the statute imposes permanent
bars for convictions for murder, sex crimes, robbery, arson, aggra-
vated assault, kidnapping, or car theft.136  In Utah, people who are
required to register as sex offenders for life are permanently barred
from changing their legal names. 137  In West Virginia, petitioners are
permanently barred if they have been convicted of a felony while in-
carcerated or are required to register as a sex offender for life; if peti-
tioners have convictions for first-degree murder or kidnapping, they
do not become eligible to change their names until ten years have
elapsed since the termination of their sentences.138  In Iowa and Flor-
ida, petitioners with felony convictions are restricted from changing
their legal names until their suspended civil rights have been restored
through a grant of executive clemency, completion of sentence and
supervisory periods, and full payment of restitution.139  In Florida,
certain convictions lead to permanent restrictions on changing one’s
legal name, while others invoke waiting periods between five and
seven years.140
In Illinois, petitioners convicted of any felony are not eligible to
change their names for ten years after completing their sentences, and
convictions for certain felonies and misdemeanors relating to sex
crimes or identity theft create a permanent bar to changing their legal
names.141  Illinois is one of six states with permanent name-change
bars, and Illinois has the longest waiting period that encompasses the
largest number of convictions.142  Therefore, Illinois has the most re-
strictive name-change statute in the country.143
135. LA. STAT. ANN. § 13:4751(D); LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:2(B) (West, Westlaw through 2017
1st Extraordinary Sess.).
136. 54 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 702.
137. UTAH CODE ANN. § 42-1-1 (Westlaw through 2016 3d Spec. Sess.);
138. W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 15-12-3, 48-25-103, 61-2-14.
139. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 68.07 (West, Westlaw through 2017 1st Reg. Sess.); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 674.2 (West, Westlaw through legislation effective as of May 5, 2017).
140. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 68.07.
141. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/21-101 (2014).
142. While West Virginia has a ten-year wait period for murder and for any felony conviction
that occurred while the petitioner was incarcerated, Illinois’ ten-year wait period applies to all
felony convictions. Compare W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-25-103, with 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/21-
101.
143. Louisiana’s criminal name-change restrictions may appear to be more restrictive than
Illinois’ because Louisiana has permanent bars for forty-five enumerated “violent” felonies. LA.
STAT. ANN. §§ 13:4751(D), 14:2(B)(1)–(46) (West, Westlaw through 2017 1st Extraordinary
Sess.).  Convictions for many of these felonies—including aggravated battery, criminal damage
to property, robbery, arson, carjacking, and unlawful use of a weapon—would only subject a
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Beyond these statutory guidelines, courts have also developed their
own standards for determining whether to grant name change peti-
tions.144  Courts have denied name change petitions because the
names were found to be obscene, offensive, bizarre, confusing, typo-
graphically unconventional, fraudulent, misleading, or had the poten-
tial to incite violence.145  However, courts rarely publish or record
their decisions from name change proceedings, and they frequently
borrow standards from other states that have similar statutory lan-
guage.146  While name change caselaw is fairly consistent among states
with similar statutory schema, judges are vested with a great amount
of discretion in deciding whether to grant or deny a petition.147  Ap-
pellate courts are generally deferential to county courts, although
some appellate judges are now more frequently reversing name-
change denials for failure to cite evidence that the name change is not
in the public interest.148
B. Criminalization
To understand why the Illinois name-change criminal restrictions
exist, it is imperative to understand the social and legal landscape of
mass incarceration in which the 1993, 1996, and 2007 amendments to
the name-change statute were passed.149  The following Sections pro-
vide a historical overview of mass incarceration, as well as current
demographic data regarding groups who are disproportionately repre-
petitioner to a ten-year wait period in Illinois.  By comparison, in Illinois, certain felony identity
theft and misdemeanor sex crimes convictions subject petitioners to permanent bars, while those
convictions do not create a name change barrier in Louisiana.  735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/21-101.
Further, Louisiana does not have any waiting periods, while Illinois’ ten-year wait period applies
to many non-violent felonies that do not invoke any restrictions in Louisiana, e.g., possession of
a controlled substance (720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 570/401 (2014)), prostitution (note that as of 2013,
prostitution can no longer be charged as a felony in Illinois, but prior convictions for felony
prostitution can still invoke ten-year wait period), retail theft (720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/16-25
(2014)), residential burglary (720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/19-3 (2014)), and criminal trespass to state
property (720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/21-5 (2014)).  On these bases, Illinois criminal name-change
restrictions are at least as restrictive as Louisiana’s, if not more restrictive, because of the barri-
ers for certain misdemeanors and non-violent offenses.
144. Kushner, supra note 37, at 333. R
145. Id. at 334.
146. Id. at 332.
147. Id. at 335.
148. Id. at 333.
149. Change of Name: Convicted Felons, Ill. Public Act No. 88-25 (1993) (codified as
amended at 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/21-101 (2014)); Change of Name: Prisoners, Ill. Public Act
No. 89-192 (1996) (codified as amended at 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/21-101); An Act in Relation
to Criminal Offenders, Ill. Public Act 89-462, § 10 (1996) (codified as amended at 730 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 150/10 (2014)); Ill. Public Act 94-944 (2007) (codified as amended at 735 ILL. COMP. STAT.
5/21-101).
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sented in the criminal legal system—in particular, transgender people
of color.150
1. Prohibiting Name Changes in the Age of Mass Incarceration
Illinois’ criminal name-change restrictions were enacted during the
modern era of mass racialized incarceration.151  As this Comment ar-
gues, Illinois’ criminal name-change restrictions are one component of
the prison-industrial complex (PIC), and one cannot understand how
these criminal name-change restrictions function on a systemic scale
without understanding the surrounding context of mass
incarceration.152
Today, the United States is home to five percent of the world’s pop-
ulation, yet it has twenty-five percent of the world’s prisoners.153  The
United States is the world’s leader in incarceration, with 2.3 million
people currently housed in the nation’s prisons or jails.154  “Combin-
ing the number of people in prison and jail with those under parole or
probation supervision, 1 in every 31 adults, or 3.2 percent of the popu-
lation is under some form of correctional control.”155  Together, Black
and Latinx people made up fifty-eight percent of all prisoners in 2008,
even though they represented approximately twenty-five percent of
the U.S. population.156  Black people are incarcerated at nearly six
times the rate of white people.157  One in ten Black men in their thir-
ties is in prison or jail on any given day,158 and one in three Black men
born in 2001 can expect to spend time in prison during his lifetime.159
150. See infra notes 151–91 and accompanying text. R
151. Much has been written about the extent, history, collateral consequences, and underlying
causes of mass incarceration. See generally, e.g., ANGELA DAVIS, ARE PRISONS OBSOLETE?
(2003).  This Comment will not provide an extensive analysis of mass incarceration.  However,
this context is important to understand the relevance of the name change felony wait period.
152. See infra notes 463–519 and accompanying text (arguing criminal name-change restric- R
tions are part of the PIC); see also DAVIS, supra note 151, at 23 (defining prison-industrial R
complex).
153. Criminal Justice Fact Sheet, NAACP, http://www.naacp.org/pages/criminal-justice-fact-
sheet (last visited Jan. 17, 2017); Criminal Justice Facts, SENT’G PROJECT, http://
www.sentencingproject.org/criminal-justice-facts/ (last visited Jan. 17, 2017).
154. Criminal Justice Fact Sheet, supra note 153. R
155. Id.
156. Id.; see also U.S. Has World’s Highest Incarceration Rate, POPULATION REFERENCE BU-
REAU, http://www.prb.org/Publications/Articles/2012/us-incarceration.aspx (last visited Jan. 17,
2017).
157. U.S. Has World’s Highest Incarceration Rate, supra note 156. R
158. Fact Sheet: Trends in U.S. Incarceration, SENT’G PROJECT, http://
www.sentencingproject.org/publications/trends-in-u-s-corrections/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2017),
159. Criminal Justice Fact Sheet, supra note 153 R
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Yet, studies show that Black people do not engage in criminal activity
any more than white people.160
The criminal legal system has not always looked this way: From the
time the penitentiary was invented in Colonial America until the end
of the Civil War, prisoners were predominantly white.161  The
demographics began to shift in the years following the Civil War, with
the passage of racist laws like the Black Codes.162  The total prison
population then skyrocketed and the race gap exponentially widened
starting in the 1970s, when the United States launched the War on
Drugs.163  Due to factors such as increased government spending on
police and disparate sentencing in drug laws, the combined state and
federal prison population in the United States has quintupled in the
last forty years.164  Much of this increase occurred in the 1990s, when
Congress and state legislatures passed a series of “tough on crime”
laws, including “three-strikes” sentencing laws,165 sex offender regis-
tration laws,166 and “truth in sentencing” laws.167  One of the driving
motivations behind the passage of these laws was the public percep-
tion that “dangerous criminals,” like “sexual predators,” were on the
rise.168  Meanwhile, crime rates remained stable during this time pe-
riod, and some studies indicate that they were actually declining.169
Because of this enormous expansion of the prison system, today
160. MICHAEL TONRY, PUNISHING RACE: A CONTINUING AMERICAN DILEMMA 39–47 (2011).
161. DAVIS, supra note 151, at 26–33 (explaining how prisons went from majority white to R
majority people of color in the years following the Civil War).
162. Id.  For a more detailed description of the Black Codes, see id. at 28.
163. Id.; MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE
OF COLORBLINDNESS 40–50 (2011) (explaining how the “war on drugs” and “law and order”
rhetoric were part of a conservative backlash against the Civil Rights movement); TONRY, supra
note 160, at 35 (providing a graph displaying growing racial disparities in incarceration). R
164. Criminal Justice Fact Sheet, supra note 153. R
165. See, e.g., Violent Crime Control & Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c)
(2012).
166. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2250 (2012).
167. See, e.g., 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-6-3 (2014). See generally DAVIS, supra note 151, at 23; R
Arit John, A Timeline of the Rise and Fall of ‘Tough on Crime’ Drug Sentencing, ATLANTIC
(Apr. 22, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/04/a-timeline-of-the-rise-and-
fall-of-tough-on-crime-drug-sentencing/360983/ (explaining how the factors listed here contrib-
uted to the growth of the prison population); Criminal Justice Facts, supra note 153. R
168. LOI¨C WACQUANT, PUNISHING THE POOR: THE NEOLIBERAL GOVERNMENT OF SOCIAL
INSECURITY 214 (2009) (“[The sexual predator] provides an urgent and perpetually refreshed
motive for the full repudiation of the ideal of rehabilitation and the turn to fierce neutralization
and vengeful retribution that has characterized U.S. penal policy since the late 1970s.”).
169. DAVIS, supra note 151, at 92; WACQUANT, supra note 168, at 212 (“[T]he tally of rapes in R
the country recorded by the National Crime Victimization Survey reveals a stagnation at around
2.5 victims per 1,000 persons age twelve or older from 1973 till 1988, followed by a steady decline
until 1995 . . . just when the furor over sex-related crimes peaked.”).
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nearly one in three adults in the United States has a criminal
record.170
2. The Criminalization of Transgender People of Color
Transgender people are disproportionately criminalized.171  In 2011,
the National Transgender Discrimination Survey report Injustice at
Every Turn detailed the inordinately high numbers and “wide range
of alarming experiences of transgender and gender non-conforming
people with police and the criminal justice system.”172  “Black and
Latin[x] incidences of being incarcerated due only to gender identity/
expression were at 41% and 21% respectively. . . . Sixteen percent
(16%) of respondents reported being sent to jail or prison ‘for any
reason.’”173  One year later, the Center for American Progress noted
that although “gay and transgender youth represent just 5 percent to 7
percent of the nation’s overall youth population, they compose 13 per-
cent to 15 percent of those currently in the juvenile justice system.”174
Transgender and gender nonconforming people are over-represented
in the criminal legal system due to racist and transphobic policing,
lack of trans-competent legal advocacy, and poverty resulting from in-
tersectional discrimination in education, housing, employment, and
medical care.175
Transgender people disproportionately face poverty for a number
of reasons.176  One reason is that they may be kicked out of their
home at an early age because their parents or guardians are not sup-
portive of their transition.177  Housing instability can become a barrier
to finishing school and obtaining employment.178  Transgender young
people may also be pushed out of school due to harassment from
170. Americans with Criminal Records, SENT’G PROJECT, http://www.sentencingproject.org/
wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Americans-with-Criminal-Records-Poverty-and-Opportunity-Pro-
file.pdf (last visited Jan. 17, 2017).
171. JOEY L MOGUL ET AL., QUEER (IN)JUSTICE: THE CRIMINALIZATION OF LGBT PEOPLE
IN THE UNITED STATES 46–48 (Michael Bronski ed., 2011).
172. GRANT ET AL., supra note 14, at 158. R
173. Id. at 163.  This study only surveyed transgender people who were not incarcerated at the
time, so this number is likely much higher.
174. The Unfair Criminalization of Gay and Transgender Youth: An Overview of the Exper-
iences of LGBT Youth in the Juvenile Justice System, AM. PROGRESS, https://
www.americanprogress.org/issues/lgbt/reports/2012/06/29/11730/the-unfair-criminalization-of-
gay-and-transgender-youth/ (last visited Jan. 17, 2017).
175. See QUICK GUIDE, supra note 20; see also SYLVIA RIVERA L. PROJECT, SYSTEMS OF INE- R
QUALITY: CRIMINAL JUSTICE, https://srlp.org/files/disproportionate_incarceration_1.pdf (last vis-
ited Jan. 27, 2017) [hereinafter SYSTEMS OF INEQUALITY].
176. See QUICK GUIDE, supra note 20; see also SYSTEMS OF INEQUALITY, supra note 175. R
177. GRANT ET AL., supra note 14, at 88. R
178. GRANT ET AL., supra note 14, at 23, 106. R
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other students, being forced to use a bathroom that does not comport
with their gender, or because teachers refuse to use the correct name
and gender pronouns for the student.179  Even if they are able to com-
plete school, it is extremely difficult to apply for and secure work
without an address.180  As a result of these factors, many transgender
people resort to committing survival crimes, like retail theft or sex
work, in order to feed or house themselves.181  A criminal record is
often a bar to employment, which then forces trans people back into
participating in survival crimes, and the cycle of poverty and criminal-
ization continues.182
In addition, police often profile transgender women of color as sex
workers.183  While many transgender people do engage in sex work as
a form of survival—particularly when doors to legitimate work are
closed due to discrimination on the basis of trans identity or criminal
history—television shows, news articles, and movies have created a
stereotype of transgender women of color in particular as sex work-
ers.184  Police, judges, and attorneys are not immune to that subcon-
scious bias.185  As a result, many transgender women of color report
having been arrested for merely being in public—a phenomenon that
some trans people have termed “walking while trans.”186
Once transgender people enter the criminal legal system, they face
discrimination from judges and attorneys who do not understand the
connections between their transgender identities and alleged criminal
activities.187  Post-conviction, they may be sent to prison or jail, where
they are almost exclusively housed according to their gender as as-
signed at birth, meaning that transgender women are housed in men’s
facilities.188  Correctional staff and other prisoners relentlessly punish
179. Id. at 33 (stating that seventy-eight percent of transgender people report being harassed
at school, thirty-one percent being harassed by teachers or staff, and fifteen percent report that
they dropped out due to severe harassment).
180. Id. at 106.
181. Id. at 119 (stating that sixty-nine percent of currently homeless transgender people report
working in an underground economy to survive, and fifty-five percent report engaging in sex
work).
182. SYSTEMS OF INEQUALITY, supra note 175. R
183. GRANT ET AL., supra note 14, at 158. R
184. Id.; MOGUL ET AL., supra note 171, at 61. R
185. GRANT ET AL., supra note 14, at 158. R
186. Chase Strangio, Arrested for Walking While Trans: An Interview with Monica Jones,
ACLU (Apr. 2, 2014, 11:19AM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/arrested-walking-while-trans-inter-
view-monica-jones.
187. MOGUL ET AL., supra note 171, at 72–79. R
188. Very little data exists regarding incarceration rates and experiences of violence in prison
for transgender men, compared to similar data for transgender women.  When transgender men
are incarcerated, they are almost exclusively housed in women’s prisons.  Lori Girshick, Out of
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gender nonconformity with threats, violence, and sexual assault, caus-
ing long-lasting psychological trauma that, even by itself, contributes
to recidivism and creates yet another barrier to employment and other
resources.189  Many transgender people understand these risks, which
make them more likely to accept plea deals, even if they are innocent,
simply to minimize the risks associated with being incarcerated as a
transgender person.190
Due in part to these trends in criminalization, thousands of trans-
gender people in Illinois have criminal records, and a disproportionate
number of them are women of color.191
C. Constitutional Doctrines
Illinois’ criminal name-change restrictions potentially impact
thousands of transgender people, and the Constitution, as the legal
foundation of fundamental rights and protections for marginalized mi-
nority groups, is an appealing source of arguments in favor of abolish-
ing the restrictions.192  Three constitutional provisions are relevant to
challenging Illinois’ criminal name-change restrictions: the First
Amendment Freedom of Speech Clause and the Fourteenth Amend-
ment Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses.193
1. First Amendment Jurisprudence
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution states,
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assem-
ble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”194
While this Amendment only explicitly refers to “speech,” the Court
has traditionally interpreted this Clause to protect “freedom of ex-
Compliance: Masculine-Identified People in Women’s Prisons, in CAPTIVE GENDERS: TRANS EM-
BODIMENT AND THE PRISON INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX 189, 190 (Eric A. Stanley & Nat Smith eds.,
2011); see also MOGUL ET AL., supra note 171, at 107. R
189. Girshick, supra note 188, at 189–206; see also MOGUL ET AL., supra note 171, at 106–09; R
Julia Sudbury, Maroon Abolitionists: Black Gender-Oppressed Activists in the Anti-Prison Move-
ment in the U.S. and Canada, 9 MERIDIANS: FEMINISM, RACE, TRANSNATIONALISM, 2009, at 1,
14–17.
190. MOGUL ET AL., supra note 171, at 76. R
191. See supra note 16 and accompanying text (estimating the number of transgender Illi- R
noisans subject to the criminal name-change restrictions).
192. See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Constitution and Fundamental Rights, 18 U. FLA. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y (2007) (discussing how the U.S. Constitution protects fundamental rights, particu-
larly for minority groups).
193. See infra notes 194–297 and accompanying text. R
194. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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pression,” which more broadly includes the ability of an individual or
group of individuals to verbally or nonverbally express their beliefs,
thoughts, ideas, and emotions about different issues, free from gov-
ernment censorship.195
From the time that the First Amendment was framed through the
early twentieth century, the legal theory upon which freedom of
speech was based was the notion of the “free market of ideas,” mirror-
ing the laissez-faire approach that the government took in regulating
the free market economy.196  In other words, the Court reasoned that
the First Amendment protected freedom of expression because, like a
capitalist economy, a public exchange of ideas free of government re-
strictions would enhance the progress of the nation as a whole.197  In
the New Deal Era, the Court deemphasized this legal theory and took
the approach that freedom of expression should be protected because
freely expressing oneself is inherent to the functioning of a democratic
society.198  While some forms of speech may be provocative or chal-
lenging, a democratic government cannot censure public expression
merely because it causes “inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest.”199
Today, the predominant legal theory behind the First Amendment
is to protect and enhance individual autonomy.  Self-expression, either
verbally or through their actions, is a crucial process of self-definition
that cannot be abrogated except in extreme circumstances.200  Under
this view of the First Amendment, each person is respected as an au-
tonomous individual and should be granted a great degree of defer-
ence in how they express themselves.201  Freedom of expression has
intrinsic value as an end in itself, and the state’s paternalistic censor-
ship of a person’s expression is wrong because it interferes with that
person’s autonomy.202  As Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote, “The
First Amendment serves not only the needs of the polity but also
195. David A. Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom of Expression, 91 COLUM. L.
REV. 334, 337–38 (1991).
196. See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring), over-
ruled in part by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
197. C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV.
964, 990–91 (1978).
198. Id. at 995.
199. Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949).
200. Baker, supra note 197, at 966. R
201. See David Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral Theory of the First
Amendment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 45, 62 (1974).
202. See Baker, supra note 197, at 966; see also Strauss, supra note 195, at 354 (arguing that a R
central principle of the First Amendment is that government may not stop speech for reason of
its power to persuade the listener, and that “[v]iolating the persuasion principle is wrong for
some of the reasons that lies of this kind are wrong: both involve a denial of autonomy in the
sense that they interfere with a person’s control over her own reasoning process”).
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\66-2\DPL214.txt unknown Seq: 29  7-JUL-17 11:03
2017] DISMANTLING COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES 675
those of the human spirit—a spirit that demands self-expression.  To
suppress expression is to reject the basic human desire for recognition
and affront the individual’s worth and dignity.”203
This “spirit of autonomy” that the First Amendment protects is ex-
emplified in the case of West Virginia State Board of Education v. Bar-
nette.204  In that case, a group of parents challenged a public school’s
regulation requiring students to salute the American flag and recite
the pledge of allegiance.205  The Court ruled that freedom of speech
may only be restricted “to prevent grave and immediate danger to
interests which the state may lawfully protect.”206  The State argued
that it had an interest in maintaining the policy because “[n]ational
unity is the basis of national security,” and failing to compel students
to recite the pledge of allegiance would pose a grave threat to national
security.207  The Court disagreed, however, holding that the school
district overstepped its constitutional limitations and “invade[d] the
sphere of intellect and spirit” by compelling students to salute the flag
and recite the pledge.208
The Court extended this principle in Wooley v. Maynard,209 in
which a New Hampshire resident challenged a conviction under a
state law that made it a crime to obscure the state motto “Live Free or
Die” on license plates.210  The defendant objected to the motto on
ideological grounds.211  The State argued that police officers needed
to be able to see the state motto on license plates in order to readily
identify cars registered in New Hampshire.212  The Court found the
State’s argument unpersuasive and struck down the statute because it
“broadly stifle[d] fundamental personal liberties.”  Further, the means
of the law were not necessary to achieving the stated ends.213  The
Court was concerned that the statute forced the defendant to use his
“private property as a ‘mobile billboard’ for the State’s ideological
message—or suffer a penalty . . . .”214  This problem was compounded
203. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 427 (1974) (Marshall, J., concurring).
204. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), overruled on other grounds by
Church of Scientology Flag Serv. Org. v. City of Clearwater, 2 F.3d 1514 (11th Cir. 1993).
205. Id. at 626, 629.
206. Id. at 639.
207. Id. at 640 (citing Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 595 (1940), overruled by
W. Va. State Bd. of Educ., 319 U.S. 624).
208. Id. at 642.
209. 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
210. Id. at 709.
211. Id. at 707.
212. Id. at 716.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 715.
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by the fact that displaying a license plate was a necessary condition for
driving a car, which in turn was a “virtual necessity for most Ameri-
cans.”215  The Court reasoned that, even if the government had a com-
pelling interest in identifying its residents, police could identify New
Hampshire license plates by reading the actual letters and numbers on
the plate without reference to the motto.216  Thus, the means were not
necessary to achieve the purpose of identifying New Hampshire
residents.217
The First Amendment right to freedom of expression is one of the
most well-established fundamental rights.218  Unless the state can ar-
ticulate a grave and immediate danger that requires censorship of a
person’s expression, the Court is very deferential to people’s auton-
omy over how they express themselves.219
2. Due Process Jurisprudence
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects
fundamental rights, particularly for minority groups,220 and states,
“No state shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law.”221  The Supreme Court has developed
substantive due process review as a means of protecting the rights of
individuals from legislation that is enacted by the majority and ex-
ceeds government authority.222  The Supreme Court has applied strict
scrutiny substantive due process review to any law that directly im-
pinges upon a fundamental right (e.g., the right to privacy) which
qualifies as a “liberty” interest under the Due Process Clause.223  Ar-
eas of privacy that the Court has protected under this line of cases
include reproductive decisions;224 a parent’s right to make decisions
regarding the education, care, control, and custody of their chil-
215. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 715.
216. Id. at 716.
217. Id. at 717.
218. Baker, supra note 197, at 965; see also Strauss, supra note 195, at 340. R
219. Strauss, supra note 195, at 334. R
220. Kushner, supra note 37, at 342. R
221. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
222. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 756–65 (1997) (discussing the historical de-
velopment of substantive due process review).
223. See Carrey v. Population Servs., Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 684 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 164 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 454-55 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 485 (1965); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942), overruling recognized in
State v. Parvin, 326 P.3d 832, 837 (Wash. Ct. App. 2014); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510,
533-34 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
224. See, e.g., Troxell v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000); Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod.
Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983), overruled by Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 870
(1992); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 647 (1979); Carrey, 431 U.S. at 684; Planned Parenthood
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dren;225 the right to intimate association;226 and the right to decide
family living arrangements.227
The Court has used two tests to determine whether an asserted in-
terest qualifies as a fundamental privacy right, thus triggering strict
scrutiny under substantive due process review.228  The conservative
approach asks whether that asserted privacy interest is a “fundamen-
tal right deeply rooted in the nation’s history or in the concept of or-
dered liberty.”229  For example, in Washington v. Glucksberg,230 the
Court held that the right to assisted suicide is not “deeply rooted in
the nation’s history” because laws have criminalized suicide since the
nation’s founding.231  By contrast, in Moore v. City of East Cleve-
land,232 the Court invalidated a city zoning ordinance that restricted
occupancy to members of a single nuclear family because living ar-
rangements involving extended family members were just as “deeply
rooted in the nation’s history.”233  Justice Powell’s plurality opinion
acknowledged that while “the history of the Lochner era demon-
strates” why substantive due process review must be used with “cau-
tion and restraint.”234  Justice Powell continued, “Appropriate limits
on substantive due process come not from drawing arbitrary lines but
rather from ‘careful respect for the teachings of history [and] solid
recognition of the basic values that underlie our society.”235
The liberal approach asks whether an asserted privacy interest is
“central to personal dignity and autonomy or is at the heart of lib-
erty.”236  The Court has used the liberal approach to protect freedom
of thought, expression, and intimate conduct, particularly for minority
groups.237  For example, in the case of Lawrence v. Texas,238 the Court
struck down a state law criminalizing sodomy because the right to inti-
v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 69 (1976); Roe, 410 U.S. at 153; Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 454-55; Gris-
wold, 381 U.S. at 485; Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541; Pierce, 268 U.S. at 533.
225. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 533; Meyer, 262 U.S. at 403.
226. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 99 (1987);
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1967).
227. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 498-99 (1977).
228. Kushner, supra note 37, at 343. R
229. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 727 (1997); see Kushner, supra note 37, at 343. R
230. 521 U.S. 702.
231. Id. at 774.
232. 431 U.S. 494.
233. Id. at 503.
234. Id. at 502-03.
235. Id.
236. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003) (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 851 (1992)); Kushner, supra note 37, at 343. R
237. Kushner, supra note 37, at 343. R
238. 539 U.S. 558.
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mate association is “central to personal dignity and autonomy.”239  In
Roe v. Wade,240 the Court famously struck down a state statute that
restricted abortions because laws proscribing abortion impinged upon
a fundamental privacy right to decide whether to bear a child.”241  By
contrast, in Planned Parenthood v. Casey,242 the Court applied the lib-
eral standard to uphold a portion of a state law that imposed a twenty-
four hour waiting period on obtaining an abortion because it merely
imposed an inconvenience rather than “substantially burdening” a
fundamental privacy right.243
If a state law impinges upon a fundamental right under one of these
tests, then the Court uses strict scrutiny to analyze the constitutional-
ity of that law.244  To satisfy strict scrutiny, a state law must be a neces-
sary means of achieving a compelling governmental interest.245  By
balancing the ends and means of a state statute, the Due Process
Clause acts as a check on the state’s power to restrict an individual’s
personal dignity.246
3. Equal Protection Jurisprudence
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment also
protects against abuses of government authority,247 stating that “no
state shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protec-
tion of its laws.”248  This clause was included in the Fourteenth
Amendment in order to counteract the Black Codes enacted after the
Civil War and to establish congressional authority to protect formerly
enslaved people by making equal protection a federal constitutional
matter.249  Part of the philosophy behind the Equal Protection Clause
was that minority groups who do not have an equal say in the govern-
ment process deserve more judicial protection in order to prevent the
tyranny of the majority, and also to prevent the government from es-
tablishing permanent castes of people.250  The heart of the Equal Pro-
239. Id. at 574 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 851).
240. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
241. Id. at 164.
242. 505 U.S. 833.
243. Id. at 887.
244. See, e.g., Roe, 410 U.S. at 150. R
245. Id.
246. Kushner, supra note 37, at 326. R
247. Suzanne B. Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 481, 516 (2004).
248. U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1.
249. The Heritage Guide to the Constitution: Equal Protection, HERITAGE, http://
www.heritage.org/constitution/#!/amendments/14/essays/171/equal-protection (last visited Jan.
18, 2017).
250. Id.
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tection analysis is that the government must treat similarly situated
people similarly by guaranteeing equal fundamental rights for all.251
The Court has developed three tiers of Equal Protection analysis:
strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, and minimal scrutiny.252  In or-
der to determine which standard to apply, the Court typically begins
by analyzing the classification involved.253  The Court applies a higher
tier of scrutiny if the classification is “suspect” or “quasi suspect,” de-
pending on the following factors: (1) if the classification is an immuta-
ble trait that is an accident of birth for which the individual should
bear no responsibility; (2) if the classification has the goal of “invidi-
ous discrimination”; (3) if the classification is historically based on
prejudice and bias; or (4) if the classification is directed at a “discrete
and insular minority group” subject to a history of purposeful discrim-
ination or relegated to a position of political powerlessness.254
The Court has applied strict scrutiny to classifications based on race
and alienage.255  Under strict scrutiny, the state’s statutory classifica-
tion must be a “necessary” means of achieving a “compelling” govern-
ment interest.256  The Court has used strict scrutiny to invalidate
racially segregated schools,257 anti-miscegenation laws,258 racial segre-
gation in prisons,259 and state laws denying welfare benefits to non-
citizens.260  Conversely, the Court has applied strict scrutiny to uphold
laws that are facially neutral yet have a disparate racial impact, if the
Court finds insufficient proof of intent to discriminate.261  For exam-
ple, in Washington v. Davis,262 the Court upheld a police test that dis-
proportionately excluded Black people from serving on the city police
force because the Court found that the police did not explicitly intend
to exclude Black people.263
Additionally, the Court has applied strict scrutiny to state laws that
impinge upon fundamental constitutional rights such as voting and
251. Id.
252. Goldberg, supra note 247, at 482. R
253. Id. at 494.
254. Id. at 496 (quoting United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)).
255. Id. at 500.
256. Id. at 543; see also KATHLEEN SULLIVAN & NOAH FELDMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 602
(18th ed. 2013).
257. See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 298 (1955).
258. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1967).
259. See, e.g., Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162 (2005).
260. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376 (1971).
261. SULLIVAN & FELDMAN, supra note 256, at 643. R
262. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
263. Id. at 249.
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equal access to the courts.264  Under this branch of strict scrutiny, the
Court struck down laws imposing poll taxes,265 laws restricting the
right to vote to property owners,266 and laws denying free appointed
counsel to criminal appellants.267  The Court has been generally pro-
tective of voting rights because the Constitution explicitly refers to
them, and also because the Court considers them to be too fundamen-
tal to be restricted in most cases.268  In Harper v. Virginia State Board
of Elections,269 the Court applied strict scrutiny and struck down a poll
tax.270  The Court reasoned that voting protects all other rights
through the democratic process, and thus “the right to vote is too pre-
cious, too fundamental to be so burdened or conditioned.”271  By con-
trast, in Crawford v. Marion County Election Board,272 a plurality
opinion upheld Indiana’s Voter ID law under strict scrutiny because
the Court found that there was a compelling government interest in
preventing in-person voter fraud, even though the State presented no
evidence that anyone had ever attempted such a thing in Indiana.273
The Court has applied intermediate scrutiny to classifications based
on gender.274  Under intermediate scrutiny, the state has the burden
of proving that a statutory classification serves “important” govern-
ment objectives, and the means employed must be “substantially” re-
lated to those objectives.275  In order to be “important,” the state’s
objectives must not rely on a generalization, and must be genuine,
rather than hypothesized or invented post hoc.276  For example, in
United States v. Virginia,277 the Court used intermediate scrutiny to
hold that a men-only military academy violated the Equal Protection
clause because no other institution in the state provided that kind of
instruction, and the women-only military academy in the state was in-
ferior in terms of the quality of education provided.278  Thus, the state
264. SULLIVAN & FELDMAN, supra note 256, at 768. R
265. See Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966).
266. See City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204, 213 (1970); Cipriano v. City of Houma,
395 U.S. 701, 706 (1969); Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 633 (1969).
267. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
268. SULLIVAN & FELDMAN, supra note 256, at 768 (noting that the Fourteenth, Nineteenth, R
Twenty-fourth, and Twenty-sixth Amendments limit state power over voting access).
269. 383 U.S. 663.
270. Id. at 666.
271. Id. at 670.
272. 553 U.S. 181 (2008).
273. Id. at 200–02.
274. SULLIVAN & FELDMAN, supra note 256, at 715. R
275. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
276. See id. at 200–04.
277. 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
278. Id. at 524.
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did not have an “important” interest in excluding women, and the
means were not “substantially related.”279
The Court generally applies minimal scrutiny analysis to classifica-
tions based on poverty,280 disability,281 age,282 and felony status.283
Under minimal scrutiny, the Court balances the means and ends of
the law, and it will strike down a law whose means are not reasonably
related to reasonable governmental interests.284  Simply providing any
reason for the law is not sufficient to survive minimal scrutiny: “[T]he
classification must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon
some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the
object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced
shall be treated alike.”285  In the case of Richardson v. Ramirez,286 a
person with a felony conviction who had completed his sentence al-
leged that a state law disenfranchising people with felony convictions
violated the Equal Protection Clause because it impinged upon the
fundamental right to vote.287  While the Court agreed that voting is a
fundamental right, it applied minimal scrutiny to the classification
based on felony status because section two of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment explicitly permits disenfranchisement of people who have “par-
ticipat[ed] in rebellion, or other crime.”288  The Court ultimately
upheld the law on the grounds that denying people with felony convic-
tions the right to vote is reasonably related to the reasonable govern-
mental interest of preventing voter fraud.289  Courts have similarly
applied minimal scrutiny to laws that prohibit people with certain con-
victions from holding certain jobs290 and living in subsidized hous-
279. Id.
280. See, e.g., James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 142 (1971) (upholding California constitutional
requirement that no low rent housing projects be developed without prior approval by
referendum).
281. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (striking down
ordinance requiring special use permit to build a home for people with cognitive disabilities).
282. See, e.g., Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (upholding mandatory retire-
ment age for state police).
283. See, e.g., Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974) (holding that a law disenfranchising
felons did not violate the Equal Protection clause).
284. See id.; see also Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
285. F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
286. 418 US 24 (1974).
287. Id. at 24–26.
288. Id. at 42; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
289. Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 55–56 (1974).
290. See, e.g., Smith v. Fussenich, 440 F. Supp. 1077 (D. Conn. 1977) (upholding a law prohib-
iting people with felony convictions working as private detective); Butts v. Nichols, 381 F. Supp.
573 (S.D. Iowa 1974) (upholding a law prohibiting people with felony convictions from holding
civil service jobs).
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ing,291 because these restrictions do not interfere with fundamental
rights because there is no fundamental right to food,292 employ-
ment,293 or shelter;294 courts have upheld the restrictions on the basis
that they are reasonably related to the state interest of protecting the
public.295
The Equal Protection Clause mandates that the state treat similarly
situated people similarly.296  The Court has traditionally used the
Equal Protection Clause to strike down state laws that intentionally
discriminate against minority groups or that restrict fundamental
rights, that is unless the Constitution expressly permits such
restrictions.297
* * *
The Illinois name-change statute has one of the most restrictive
criminal barriers in the country by a staggering margin.  Some of the
legislative motivations behind passing these criminal name-change re-
strictions include the desire to prevent fraudulent name changes and
fears that the police could not maintain and disseminate accurate
criminal records if people with certain convictions were eligible to
change their legal names.  These criminal name-change restrictions
were passed in the context of the mass incarceration of people of
color.  The next Part of this Comment argues that Illinois’ criminal
name-change restrictions violate the U.S. Constitution and must be
abolished.
III. ANALYSIS
The Illinois name-change statute contains three criminal restric-
tions: (1) the ten-year wait period for felonies; (2) the permanent re-
strictions for certain sex crimes; and (3) the permanent restrictions for
certain identity theft crimes.298  All three restrictions should be abol-
ished because they violate the First Amendment Freedom of Speech
291. See Hous. Auth. for Prince George’s Cty. v. Williams, 784 A.2d 621 (Ct. App. Md. 2001)
(upholding eviction of family from public housing after tenant’s minor child was convicted of
drug possession).
292. See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (upholding under minimal scrutiny
absolute cap on AFDC funds per family regardless of family size).
293. See, e.g., Butts, 381 F. Supp. at 579.
294. See, e.g., Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
295. See Dandridge, 397 U.S. 471; Hous. Auth. for Prince George’s Cty., 784 A.2d at 626–27;
Smith, 440 F. Supp. at 1080; Butts, 381 F. Supp. at 578–82.
296. Goldberg, supra note 247, at 485. R
297. Id. at 485–87.
298. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/21-101 to -105 (2014).
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Clause299 and the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses.300  These restrictions are not sound government
policy.
A. The First Amendment and the Fundamental Right to Name
Oneself
The Illinois name-change statute violates the First Amendment
right to freedom of expression.  When evaluating a constitutional
claim that a statute or policy violates the First Amendment, the Court
considers whether the state has compelling interests in maintaining
that law, and if so, whether the law is a necessary means of protecting
those interests when weighed against the extent to which the law
stifles freedom of expression.301  Freedom of expression may only be
restricted “to prevent grave and immediate danger to interests which
the State may lawfully protect.”302  The right to self-definition and au-
tonomy over one’s identity are at the heart of First Amendment
jurisprudence.303
Like the school policy at issue in Barnette, the Illinois name-change
statute “invades the sphere of intellect and spirit” by unnecessarily
compelling people convicted of certain crimes, including many trans-
gender people, to use names that do not reflect their true identities.304
This First Amendment analysis begins with the state interests in main-
taining the statute, and strict scrutiny is then applied to those inter-
ests.305  The Court generally upholds state legislation when the state
can articulate a grave and immediate danger that requires censorship
of a person’s expression.306
The state has two recognized, general interests in exercising control
over the name change process: identification and communication.307
“Identification” means the state’s ability to distinguish individuals
from one another, “track records, allocate benefits, attribute blame or
credit, grant rights, . . . impose responsibilities,” and promote public
safety.308  “Communication” refers to the ways in which the state reg-
299. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
300. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
301. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S 705, 706, 715–17 (1977).
302. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943), overruled on other
grounds by Church of Scientology Flag Serv. Org. v. City of Clearwater, 2 F.3d 1514 (11th Cir.
1993).
303. Kushner, supra note 37, at 318. R
304. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642.
305. Kushner, supra note 37, at 318. R
306. Strauss, supra note 195, at 334. R
307. Id.
308. Id.
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ulates names in order to “foster[ ] interactions among individuals, or-
ganizations, and institutions.”309  Communication, particularly verbal,
is an important public interest because the alternative—being referred
to by a number—would be dehumanizing and oppressive.310
More specifically, the Illinois General Assembly enacted the ten-
year waiting period and the permanent bars for sex crimes out of a
concern for people required to register as sex offenders who could
circumvent the community notification requirement by changing their
legal names.311  One study estimates that nationally, one in six people
convicted of sex offenses illegally manipulate their names, birthdays,
and Social Security numbers to avoid registration requirements;312
however, the Illinois Attorney General reports that ninety-three per-
cent of sex offenders are compliant with registration requirements.313
Based on this data, Illinois might argue that it has a compelling inter-
est in maintaining the permanent bars for sex crimes in order to pro-
tect the public from dangerous sex offenders who could change their
legal names and then “live in the area and no one would know of their
criminal background.”314
The State may also posit that it has a compelling interest in main-
taining accurate records of its residents, particularly criminal records.
Regarding the permanent bars for people convicted of identity theft
crimes, the State may argue that people convicted of identity theft are
more likely to change their names for fraudulent purposes, and there-
fore, the State has an interest in preventing the public from such
fraud.315  Finally, regarding the ten-year waiting period for people
convicted of all other felonies, the state may argue that it has an inter-
est in maintaining accurate criminal records.
Like the statute at issue in Barnette, the means of Illinois’ name-
change statute sweep too broadly because prohibiting people con-
victed of felonies, sex crimes, or identity theft crimes from changing
their legal names is not necessary “to prevent grave and immediate
309. Id.
310. Id. at 322.
311. See supra notes 67–85 and accompanying text (discussing legislative history of criminal R
name-change restrictions that pertain to sex offenses).
312. One in Six Sex Offenders Change Names to Avoid Registration: Study, HUFFINGTON POST
(July 26, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/07/25/sex-offenders-change-identity-
study_n_1703282.html.
313. Keeping Communities Safe, ILL. ATTORNEY GEN., http://www.illinoisattorneygeneral.
gov/communities/somb/registry.html (last visited Aug. 12, 2016).
314. H.R. Debate Transcript, 110th Leg. Day, 89th Gen. Assemb., at 107 (Ill. 1996) (statement
of Rep. Pedersen).
315. See supra notes 67–85 and accompanying text (discussing legislative history of criminal R
name-change restrictions that pertain to identity theft convictions).
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danger” to the public.316  The waiting period and permanent bars for
sex crimes were enacted in the 1990’s because some Illinois House
Representatives believed police maintained criminal records on the
basis of a person’s name and date of birth.317  Today, because more
than one person can have the same name, law enforcement agencies
maintain criminal records according to a fingerprint number unique to
each individual, and not on the basis of names.318  Police, employers,
creditors, and other institutions can also locate a person’s criminal
records by searching according to their Driver’s License number or
Social Security number.319
Further, when a person registers on the Sex Offender Registry, and
for every year that they are required to register, they must submit a
DNA sample, fingerprints, a recent photo, proof of current address,
and several pieces of government-issued ID, thereby further enhanc-
ing the state’s ability to locate and identify them.320  While first and
last names are displayed on the Sex Offender Registry, states like Ver-
mont have demonstrated that both the state and the public can easily
identify registered sex offenders even if they change their legal
name.321  In those states, notice of the name change is simply sent to
the Registry, and the name change is granted if the Registry does not
object.322  Any of these procedures would be more than sufficient to
prevent fraud and to maintain accurate records without barring name
changes on the basis of criminal history.323
The ten-year wait period sweeps more broadly, encompassing
countless non-sex-crime felony convictions, to which the logic of “pro-
tecting the public from predators” does not apply because it does not
require sex offender registration.  For example, a person convicted of
felony retail theft or possession of cannabis would be subject to the
same ten-year wait period as a person convicted of criminal sexual
316. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943), overruled on other
grounds by Church of Scientology Flag Serv. Org. v. City of Clearwater, 2 F.3d 1514 (11th Cir.
1993); see 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/21-101 (2014).
317. H.R. Debate Transcript, 89th Gen. Assemb., 110th Leg. Day, at 107 (Ill. 1996) (statement
of Rep. Pedersen).
318. In Illinois, one’s fingerprint number is called an “Internal Record Number” or “IR Num-
ber.”  Ransberry v. Dart, No. 10-C-2911, 2014 WL 1052938, at *2 & n.4 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 19, 2014).
319. ILL. STATE POLICE INFO. & TECH. COMMAND BUREAU OF IDENTIFICATION, GUIDE TO
UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL BACKGROUND CHECK INFORMATION 8–10, 24, http://
www.isp.state.il.us/docs/chriguide.pdf (last visited Jan. 24, 2017) [hereinafter CRIMINAL BACK-
GROUND CHECKS].
320. 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-4-3 (2014).
321. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 817 (West, Westlaw through Law No. 10 of the 2017 1st Sess.).
322. Id.
323. Id.
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assault.324  Therefore, the means of this law are too broad and are not
necessary to “prevent grave and immediate danger” to the public.325
The State may argue that there is a closer nexus between a convic-
tion for identity theft and changing one’s legal name because identity
theft is a crime of dishonesty and petitioners with identity theft con-
victions are more likely to change their names for fraudulent pur-
poses, rather than for the legitimate purpose of self-expression.326
Permanently barring someone from changing their legal name is still
not necessary to protect the public from people with identity theft
convictions seeking fraudulent name changes.  Two reasons support
this assertion.
First, the name change process already sufficiently protects against
fraudulent name changes without relying on criminal convictions: the
name change petitioner must certify that everything in the petition is
true and correct under penalty of perjury;327 the petitioner must pub-
lish notice of the petition for three consecutive weeks;328 anyone may
object to the name change;329 and the judge is required to ask a peti-
tioner’s reason for changing their name and make a determination of
whether that reason is fraudulent.330
Second, only six states have permanent bars or waiting periods, and
none of them include identity theft.331  In nineteen other states, peo-
ple with identity theft convictions are not required to disclose their
convictions when petitioning for a name change.332  In twenty-six
other states—including Illinois’ neighboring States of Indiana, Michi-
gan, Minnesota, and Wisconsin—people with identity theft convic-
tions or any other criminal convictions are permitted to change their
legal names, and notice of their name change is simply sent to law
enforcement and prosecutors for record keeping purposes and to give
them an opportunity to object to the name change.333  While sending
324. See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/16-25(f)(1) (2014); Cannabis Control Act, 720 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 550/5(C) (2014).
325. See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943), overruled on other
grounds by Church of Scientology Flag Serv. Org. v. City of Clearwater, 2 F.3d 1514 (11th Cir.
1993).
326. See supra notes 67–85 accompanying text (describing legislative history of the identity R
theft clauses); see supra notes 307–15 and accompanying text (describing the state’s interests in R
names).
327. PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME, supra note 93. R
328. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/21-103 (2014); A Guide to Procedures, supra note 90. R
329. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/21-101 (as implied through notice).
330. Id. §§ 21-101 to -102; see supra notes 105–09 and accompanying text (describing the stan- R
dard a judge must use to determine whether a name change is sought for the purpose of fraud).
331. See supra notes 133–40 and accompanying text (describing Group C states). R
332. See supra notes 124–25 and accompanying text (describing Group A states). R
333. See supra notes 126–32 and accompanying text (describing Group B states). R
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notice of a legal name change would require Illinois to adopt new pro-
cedures, a state cannot censure public expression merely because it
causes “inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest.”334  These alternatives
and procedural safeguards such as notice demonstrate that a lifetime
bar to changing one’s legal name is not necessary to protect the public
from people with identity theft convictions, even if they might be
seeking fraudulent name changes.  Therefore, all three of Illinois’
criminal name change restrictions are unnecessary to “prevent grave
and immediate danger.”
Further, a person’s interest in expressing their identity through their
name is too fundamental to be restricted for any reason because doing
so violates their fundamental autonomy, “invades the sphere of intel-
lect and spirit,” and restricts their ability to engage in a crucial process
of self-definition.335  Forcing someone to use a name that does not
reflect their identity fundamentally contradicts the two private inter-
ests in names: self-expression and identity-formation.336  Self-expres-
sion refers to a name’s role as a speech act: Names are a way for
people to express who they are to others, including their gender,
ethnicity, nationality, social status, religion, and kinship.337  Names are
also important for “identity-formation,” which refers to a name’s
function in describing and symbolizing an individual.338  While names
express many of a person’s identities to others, they also inform that
person’s sense of self with regard to those identities.339  Empirical
studies have found links between one’s name and one’s personality,
level of achievement, and mental health.340
For transgender people, names have even more significance.341
Names help identify a transgender person’s gender to the world.342
Outwardly expressing one’s gender when that gender is not the one
that was assigned at birth, or the one that is commonly perceived by
others, can be a very important, courageous, and often dangerous
334. Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949).
335. See David A. Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral Theory of the
First Amendment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 45, 62 (1975).
336. Kushner, supra note 37, at 318. R
337. Id.
338. Id. at 324.
339. Id. at 322.
340. Id. at 345 (citing A. Arthur Hartman et al., Unique Personal Names as a Social Adjust-
ment Factor, 75 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 107, 107 (1968)); see also Avner Falk, Identity and Name
Changes, 62 PSYCHOANALYTIC REV. 647, 651–53 (1975); Albert Mehrabian, Interrelationships
Among Name Desirability, Name Uniqueness, Emotion Characteristics Connoted by Names, and
Temperament, 22 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1797, 1797 (1992).
341. TRANSGENDER 101, supra note 9. R
342. Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\66-2\DPL214.txt unknown Seq: 42  7-JUL-17 11:03
688 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:647
act.343  When someone is transitioning from the gender they were as-
signed at birth to the gender with which they currently identify, choos-
ing their new name is often one of the first steps in building their new
identity that will be presented to the world.344
Given that transgender people typically choose new names in the
beginning stages of their gender transitions, names carry unique
weight in terms of identity-formation.345  Choosing a name that con-
forms with the gender with which one identifies is a literal act of iden-
tity-formation for many transgender people.346  For example, when a
transgender woman chooses a traditionally feminine name for herself,
she not only expresses to the world that she is a woman, but also inter-
nally affirms and develops her gender identity.347  The Court has de-
termined that a state violates the First Amendment right to freedom
of expression when it mandates that a man display the state motto on
his license plate or requires a student to say the pledge of allegiance,
so the state certainly violates that same right when it mandates a per-
son’s name—their very identity—based merely on that person’s crimi-
nal history.348
The state statute that criminalized obstructions over the state motto
on license plates in Wooley is analogous to Illinois’ criminal name-
change restrictions.349  In striking down the statute, the Court was par-
ticularly concerned with the fact that the law forced a man to use his
mandatory state-issued license plate to display a message with which
he did not identify.350  When the state of Illinois prohibits someone
from changing their legal name for any reason—including criminal
history—the state forces that person to use a name with which they do
not identify on their state-issued ID cards.351  A name is far more cen-
tral to one’s identity than a license plate.
Making matters worse, just as the Wooley Court noted that owning
a license plate and driving a car are a “virtual necessity for most
343. Id.
344. Id.
345. Id.
346. Id.
347. TRANSGENDER 101, supra note 9. R
348. See, e.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S 705, 716–17 (1977); City of Chicago v. Wilson, 389
N.E.2d 522, 523–35 (Ill. 1978) (holding that a city ordinance criminalizing “cross dressing” vio-
lated transgender people’s First Amendment rights because it was “fundamentally inconsistent
with ‘values of privacy, self-identity, autonomy, and personal integrity that . . . the Constitution
was designed to protect’” (alteration in original) (quoting Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238,
250–51 (1976))).
349. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 716–17.
350. Id.
351. See TRANSGENDER 101, supra note 9. R
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\66-2\DPL214.txt unknown Seq: 43  7-JUL-17 11:03
2017] DISMANTLING COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES 689
Americans,”352 state-issued identity documents are required for driv-
ing, renting an apartment, enrolling in school, building credit, voting
in elections, obtaining a job, obtaining medical insurance, applying for
welfare, visiting the doctor, traveling by airplane, entering certain
spaces like government buildings and bars, exiting and re-entering the
country, and more.353  Additionally, non-government identification
(ID) cards that people must use daily, like employee badges and stu-
dent ID cards, typically display names based on the government-is-
sued identity documents that were submitted to the employer or
school.354
As a condition of living in society, everyone is forced to display,
write, and utter their legal name on a daily basis.355  Illinois’ criminal
name change  restrictions force some transgender people to use a
name that does not reflect their true gender identity.  When a trans-
gender person’s gender expression does not “match” the legal name
on their identity documents, it can create a frustrating and sometimes
embarrassing exchange between the person looking at the document
and the person presenting it, as in the case of Tanya mentioned in the
Introduction of this Comment.356  At worst, it can create an unsafe
situation for the transgender individual.357
Transgender people become vulnerable to violence and discrimina-
tion on the basis of their legal names.  In 2010 a transgender woman
attempted to enter a bar and nightclub in Chicago with some
friends.358  The security guard at the door asked her for identification,
and in front of a large line of people the guard announced that the ID
displayed a masculine name, and asked the woman if she was “a
woman or a man or a faggot.”359  The guard did not allow her in be-
cause he “did not know which bathroom [she] would use.”360  The
other customers waiting in line outside who overheard the conversa-
352. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 715.
353. See Spade, supra note 17, at 734; see also TRANSGENDER 101, supra note 9. R
354. See Spade, supra note 17, at 733–34. R
355. See id.
356. See supra notes 1–8 and accompanying text (describing a common situation involving a R
hypothetical transgender woman, named Tanya, who was denied food stamps because of her
identity document); see also SPADE, supra note 20, at 144. R
357. See SPADE, supra note 20, at 146; TRANSGENDER 101, supra note 9. R
358. Manzanares v. Lalo’s Rest., No. 10-P-18 (City of Chi. Comm’n on Hum. Relations May
16, 2012).  In this case, the City of Chicago Commission on Human Relations held that a restau-
rant violated the Chicago Human Rights Ordinance, which prohibits discrimination on the basis
of gender identity or expression, when it excluded a transgender woman on the basis of a state
ID that did not reflect her true gender identity. Id.  The restaurant was ordered to pay a $500
fine to the City and $6,000 in damages to the complainant. Id.
359. Id. at 2–3.
360. Id. at 3.
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tion began jeering slurs and threatening the woman until she left.361
Experiences like this one are commonplace for transgender people
who lack government ID that accurately reflects their names and gen-
ders, and they can often escalate into physical violence and possibly
even death.362
The Defendant in Wooley was not subjected to anything nearly as
grave when the New Hampshire statute forced him to display the state
motto on his license plate, yet the Court still found that the state stat-
ute violated his First Amendment right to freedom of expression.363
When the state of Illinois mandates a transgender person’s legal
name, it not only censors that person’s beliefs, ideas, and emotions,
but it invalidates their very identity—and potentially puts them at risk
of violence as a result.  Therefore, the Illinois criminal name change
restrictions “broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties” and violate
the First Amendment right to freedom of expression.364
Having autonomy over one’s name should be considered a funda-
mental right under the First Amendment because naming oneself is a
literal act of identity formation and self-determination—particularly
for transgender people—which the First Amendment was intended to
protect.365  The name change process is the first step a transgender
individual must take to obtain documents that better fit their identity
and gain access to the spaces and resources listed above.366  When a
transgender person is granted a legal name change, that person then
has a greater ability to live as their true self, to accomplish their goals,
and to live with less fear and hesitation.367  Unfortunately, thousands
transgender people in Illinois find themselves unable to live as their
true identities because of criminal restrictions on changing their legal
names.368  Practically speaking, while anyone can simply start using a
new name without petition to the government, that person would still
be forced to use their legal name throughout the day to function in
modern society.369  A person’s interest in such a fundamental form of
expression cannot be overridden by the state because, in the words of
Justice Marshall, “[t]o suppress expression is to reject the basic human
361. Id. at 3–4.
362. See SPADE, supra note 20, at 146; TRANSGENDER 101, supra note 9. R
363. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 716–17 (1977).
364. Id. at 716.
365. See TRANSGENDER 101, supra note 9; see also Kushner, supra note 37, at 317–18. R
366. See TRANSGENDER 101, supra note 9. R
367. Id.
368. See supra note 16 and accompanying text (estimating the number of transgender people R
impacted by criminal name-change restrictions).
369. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/21-105 (2014) (“Common law name changes adopted in this State
on or after July 1, 2010 are invalid.”).
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desire for recognition and affront the individual’s worth and
dignity.”370
B. Due Process and the Fundamental Privacy Right in Names
Illinois’ criminal name-change restrictions violate the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Substantive Due Process re-
view has been used to protect fundamental rights, including privacy
interests.371  The Court has used two approaches to protect privacy
interests.372  The conservative approach asks whether the interest is a
fundamental right “deeply rooted in [the nation’s] history and tradi-
tions, or so fundamental to. . . [the] concept of ordered liberty.”373
The liberal approach is to ask whether that interest is “central to per-
sonal dignity and autonomy or is at the heart of liberty.”374  If a state
law impinges upon a fundamental right under one of these tests, then
the Court uses strict scrutiny to analyze the constitutionality of that
law.375  To satisfy strict scrutiny, a state law must be a “necessary”
means of achieving a “compelling” governmental interest.376
The criminal name-change restrictions of the Illinois name-change
statute would trigger strict scrutiny under both the conservative and
liberal approaches of substantive due process review because they im-
pinge upon the First Amendment right to determine one’s name es-
tablished in the preceding section, and they impinge upon a
fundamental privacy right.377
First, under the liberal standard of review, the ability to control
one’s name is certainly “central to personal dignity and autonomy”
because names are crucial to the private interests of identity-forma-
tion and expression, particularly for transgender people.378  Illinois’
criminal name-change restrictions diminish autonomy because choos-
370. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 427 (1974) (Marshall, J., concurring), overruled by
Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989).
371. See, e.g., Carey v. Population Serv. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 684 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 164 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453–54 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 481–82 (1965); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 544 (1942);
Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 533–34 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399
(1923).
372. Kushner, supra note 37, at 343. R
373. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21, 727 (1997); Kushner, supra note 37, at R
343.
374. Kushner, supra note 37, at 343. R
375. Id.at 343 & n.156.
376. Id. at 343.
377. See id. at 346.
378. See supra notes 341–47 and accompanying text (explaining the significance of names for R
transgender people).
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ing a name that conforms with the gender with which one identifies is
a literal act of gender identity-formation for many transgender peo-
ple.379  The criminal name-change restrictions impinge upon the dig-
nity of transgender people with felony convictions by forcing them to
“out” themselves—an extreme invasion of privacy—to employers,
schools, banks, and other institutions that require proof of identity
documentation, making them vulnerable to discrimination and vio-
lence.380  Some courts have held that transgender people have a con-
stitutionally protected privacy right to maintain the confidentiality of
their identities both as a form of medical privacy, and due to the risk
of “hostility and intolerance from others.”381
It is true that people with felony convictions are generally consid-
ered to have diminished privacy interests because they are outweighed
by the state interest in preserving public safety, but the ability to con-
trol one’s name does not become any less “central to personal dignity
and autonomy” simply because one has been convicted of a crime.382
As previously argued, the right to name oneself is so central to per-
sonal autonomy that it should qualify as a fundamental First Amend-
ment right.383  Further, courts have extended the right to privacy in
one’s transgender identity to prisoners, where inmates typically have
limited privacy expectations.384  Thus, the right to name oneself is
“central to personal dignity and autonomy” and is a fundamental pri-
vacy interest under the liberal approach.385
Second, under the conservative approach, the right to name oneself
would also qualify as a fundamental privacy interest because the abil-
ity to control one’s name free of criminal restrictions is “deeply rooted
in [the] Nation’s history and tradition.”386  When the Court applied
the conservative approach in City of Cleveland to strike down an ordi-
nance restricting occupancy to nuclear families, it noted that living ar-
rangements involving extended family members date back to the
379. TRANSGENDER 101, supra note 9. R
380. See supra notes 7–8, 22–23 and accompanying text (explaining how transgender people R
can be outed on the basis of their legal name as displayed on identity documents, and the poten-
tially disastrous results); see also GRANT ET AL., supra note 14, at 5 (describing results of study in R
which transgender people reported discrimination and violence on the basis of identity
documents).
381. See, e.g., Powell v. Schriver, 175 F.3d 107, 111–12 (2d Cir. 1999).
382. See Kushner, supra note 37, at 343. R
383. See supra notes 200–19 and accompanying text (arguing that the right to name oneself is R
a fundamental right under the First Amendment).
384. Powell, 175 F.3d 107, at 112–13.
385. See Kushner, supra note 37, at 344. R
386. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21; Kushner, supra note 37, at 343. R
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founding of the country.387  Name-change statutes did not exist until
the mid nineteenth century, and anyone could change their name with
relative ease until the criminal restrictions were passed in the “tough-
on-crime” era of the 1990s.388  Thus, for the majority of this nation’s
history, people with criminal convictions were allowed to change their
names without even petitioning the court, and have only been explic-
itly restricted from changing their names for about twenty years.389
Further, permanently barring a name change on the basis of a crimi-
nal conviction is by no means “essential to the concept of ordered
liberty” because only six states have name change felony wait periods
or permanent bars, nineteen states do not consider criminal records at
all in name change proceedings, and many states even continue to rec-
ognize the common law approach to changing one’s name.390  Clearly
the majority of American courts have deemed that public policy is
furthered by not considering prior criminal acts.  Therefore, the ability
to control one’s name free of restrictions based on criminal history
qualifies as a fundamental privacy right under the conservative
approach.391
Strict scrutiny is required to analyze the constitutionality of the law
under substantive due process review because Illinois’ criminal name-
change restrictions impinge upon a fundamental privacy right under
both the liberal and conservative approaches and the law impinges
upon a fundamental First Amendment right.392  The next issue is
whether the criminal name-change restrictions are a necessary means
of achieving a compelling government interest.393
The government interests in maintaining the restrictions are the two
public functions of names described in the preceding Section: identifi-
cation and communication.394  The state of Illinois may also contend
that it has a compelling interest in maintaining public safety through
387. Moore v. E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 507–08 (1977).
388. See supra notes 37–58 and accompanying text (discussing the historical development of R
name change restrictions).
389. See supra notes 67–85 and accompanying text (discussing legislative history of criminal R
name-change restrictions that pertain to identity theft convictions).
390. See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Proc. § 1279.5(a) (West, Westlaw through ch. 9 of 2017 Reg. Sess.)
(discussing common law name change); see supra notes 124–25, 133–40and accompanying text R
(describing states in Groups A and C); see also Kushner, supra note 37, at 328 & n.79 (listing R
states that have explicitly abrogated common law name changes).
391. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 756; Kushner, supra note 37, at 346–47. R
392. Kushner, supra note 37, at 352. R
393. Id. at 350–51.
394. See supra note 307 and accompanying text. R
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surveillance of people with certain convictions,395 preventing fraud,396
and maintaining accurate, consistent criminal records.397
Even if these government interests are “compelling,” neither a ten-
year wait period nor a permanent bar is necessary to achieve those
interests.  Again, in this technological age of surveillance, the state
easily and routinely identifies residents through Social Security num-
bers, driver’s license numbers, and more, rather than on the basis of
names.398  In Illinois, criminal records are maintained on the basis of a
number assigned to each person’s fingerprint; records are no longer
kept on the basis of name and date of birth as they were in 1990s when
the ten-year wait period and permanent bars based on sex crime con-
victions went into effect.399  When people register for the Sex Of-
fender Registry, they are required to submit a DNA sample,
fingerprint, and a host of other unique identifying information.400
Further, as a broad practice in Illinois and among many other states,
changing one’s legal name requires publishing notice of the name
change for a number of weeks, which creates a public record of the
name change and can assist the state in maintaining accurate and con-
sistent records.401  Finally, a majority of states do not have any name
change bars or wait periods, so these restrictions are not necessary to
preserve accurate records and protect public safety.402  Thus, the
means of this law are not necessary to achieve the ends.
Therefore, Illinois’ criminal name-change restrictions violate the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.403  This law re-
quires strict scrutiny analysis because it substantially burdens a funda-
mental First Amendment right and a fundamental privacy right,
particularly for transgender people.404  The means of this law are not
necessary to achieve compelling government interests, so it must fail
the strict scrutiny substantive due process review.  The Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to prohibit the
government from doing exactly what the Illinois criminal name-
395. See supra notes 307–15 and accompanying text (discussing state interests in names). R
396. See supra notes 67–85 and accompanying text (discussing legislative history of criminal R
name-change restrictions that pertain to identity theft convictions).
397. Kushner, supra note 37, at 318. R
398. Spade, supra note 17, at 731–32; see SPADE, supra note 20 at 146. R
399. CRIMINAL BACKGROUND CHECKS, supra note 319, at 8. R
400. 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-4-3 (2014)
401. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/21-101 (2014); see A Guide to Procedures, supra note 90. R
402. See supra notes 60–148 and accompanying text (comparing criminal name-change restric- R
tions among the fifty states).
403. Kushner, supra note 37, at 342–43. R
404. See supra notes 192–297 and accompanying text (discussing how criminal name-change R
restrictions burden fundamental rights under liberal and conservative approaches).
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change restrictions do: violate the fundamental dignity of a marginal-
ized minority group.  It must be abolished.
C. Equal Protection and Preventing Second-Class Citizenship
The criminal restrictions contained in Illinois’ name change statute
violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of
the U.S. Constitution.405  Like the Due Process Clause, the Equal Pro-
tection Clause was intended to protect fundamental rights, particu-
larly for politically disempowered minority groups, by requiring the
government to treat similarly situated people similarly.406  The Court
has developed three tiers of scrutiny which it applies depending on the
classifications involved: strict scrutiny has traditionally been applied to
classifications based on laws that impinge upon fundamental rights,
intermediate scrutiny to classifications based on gender, and minimal
scrutiny to classifications based on felony convictions.407
The restrictions in Illinois’ name-change statute apply to three clas-
sifications of people: (1) people with any felony convictions; (2) peo-
ple convicted of identity theft crimes; and (3) people convicted of sex
crimes.408  While the nature of these classifications may appear to be
facially neutral, the criminal justice data suggests otherwise.409  Racist
policing practices and disproportionate rates of poverty cause these
classifications to disproportionately include transgender people of
color.  This is not to say that the Illinois General Assembly, when they
passed the criminal name-change restrictions consciously set out to
penalize this group in particular;410 however, Illinois’ criminal name-
change restrictions impinge upon the fundamental rights of a politi-
cally marginalized group—namely, transgender women of color.411
Illinois’ criminal name change restrictions should be subject to strict
scrutiny because they impinge upon a proposed fundamental First
Amendment right to autonomy over one’s name and identity, which in
turn is contributing to the creation of a permanent caste system.412
Identity documents are required in order to access education, employ-
405. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
406. Goldberg, supra note 247, at 485 & n.14. R
407. See supra notes 252–97 and accompanying text (discussing three tiers of Equal Protection R
scrutiny).
408. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/21-101 (2014).
409. See supra notes 171–91and accompanying text (providing statistics on disparate impact of R
incarceration on communities of color).
410. See supra notes 67–85 and accompanying text (describing legislative history of Illinois’ R
criminal name-change restrictions, wherein transgender people are not mentioned at all).
411. See supra notes 192–297 and accompanying text (describing how criminal name-change R
restrictions impinge upon fundamental privacy and expressive rights of transgender people).
412. See supra notes 335–47 and accompanying text (describing private interests in names). R
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ment, certain buildings, and travel, among others.413  While the Court
has held that there is no fundamental right to education, it has stated
that access to education has a “fundamental role in maintaining the
fabric of society.”414  Because these restrictions force transgender peo-
ple with criminal convictions to “out” themselves as transgender, ren-
dering them vulnerable to discrimination and violence in contexts
where identity documents are required, Illinois’ name-change statute
creates significant barriers to living a safe, stable, and fulfilling life for
many transgender people.415
For people subject to the permanent bars, these barriers can last a
lifetime.416  Illinois’ criminal name-change restrictions thus help create
a permanent caste of transgender people of color who are locked out
of formal education, employment, housing, and countless other oppor-
tunities that are fundamental to living in a free democratic society.417
The Equal Protection clause was intended to prevent exactly this kind
of permanent caste system, and thus strict scrutiny should be
applied.418
Additionally, Illinois’ criminal name-change restrictions impinge
upon the fundamental right to vote by rendering transgender people
who are unable to change their legal names vulnerable to discrimina-
tion at the polls.419  While voters in Illinois are generally not required
to present ID at the polls in order to vote, early voters and new voters
who did not provide identification when they initially registered may
be required to present ID at the polls.420  When a transgender per-
son’s legal name on their ID does not “match” their gender presenta-
tion, they are often harassed, accused of lying, or forced to leave the
polling location where they presented their ID.421  While there have
been no empirical studies of whether this occurs in Illinois, the plural-
413. SPADE, supra note 20, at 146. R
414. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982), superseded by statute as recognized in Day v.
Sebelius, 376 F. Supp. 2d 1022 (D. Kan. 2005), aff’d sub nom. Day v. Bond, 500 F.3d 1127 (10th
Cir. 2007).
415. QUICK GUIDE, supra note 20 (explaining how transgender people can be outed on the R
basis of their legal name alone regardless of their legal gender marker).
416. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/21-101 (2014).
417. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 202, 230 (concerning the statute that threatened to create perma-
nent caste violated Equal Protection); see also GRANT ET AL., supra note 14, at 5 (discussing the R
effects of identity documents that do not match one’s appearance); QUICK GUIDE, supra note 20. R
418. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221–22; Goldberg, supra note 247, at 509–10. R
419. See supra notes 248–97 and accompanying text (describing fundamental rights branch of R
Equal Protection jurisprudence).
420. 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1A-16(a)(3) (2014).
421. See supra notes 19–21 and accompanying text (listing statistics regarding discrimination R
on the basis of ID); see also Love v. Johnson, 146 F. Supp. 3d 848, 855 (E.D. Mich. 2015) (con-
cerning a transgender petitioner who was publically outed and embarrassed after presenting ID
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ity in Crawford v. Marion County Election Board did not require Indi-
ana to prove that in-person voter fraud had ever occurred when the
Court upheld its voter ID law.422  Thus, the strong possibility that Illi-
nois’ criminal name-change restrictions may impinge upon trans-
gender people’s access to the polls should be sufficient to trigger strict
scrutiny.
Under strict scrutiny, the state’s statutory classification must be a
“necessary” means of achieving a “compelling” government inter-
est.423  Illinois’ interests in maintaining the name change felony wait
period and the permanent bars based on sex crimes include protecting
the public from convicted sex offenders, and maintaining accurate
records of state residents.424  Illinois’ interest in maintaining the per-
manent bars based on identity theft crimes is to prevent fraudulent
name changes.425  The Court would likely consider these state inter-
ests to be “compelling” because Illinois’ interest in protecting the pub-
lic by keeping accurate criminal records would fall under the state’s
police powers.426
The means of Illinois’ criminal name-change restrictions are, how-
ever, vastly overbroad for achieving these goals because Illinois can
maintain accurate criminal records without restricting name
changes—for example, by sending notice of the name change to law
enforcement agencies, the Sex Offender Registry, and prosecutors’ of-
fices, as many other states do.427  Further, the permanent bars for
identity theft convictions are overbroad because Illinois’ name change
procedures already sufficiently guard against fraudulent name
changes.428  Finally, the ten-year name change felony wait period is
both over inclusive and under inclusive for achieving the government
interests involved.  This portion of the statute is over inclusive because
it restricts people convicted of crimes that have nothing to do with sex
at polling location, and other transgender petitioners who were embarrassed and accused of
lying after presenting ID at retail stores and bars).
422. Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 202–03 (2008).
423. Goldberg, supra note 247, at 496, 500–01. R
424. See supra notes 307–15 and accompanying text (describing the state’s interests in names). R
425. See supra notes 67–85 and accompanying text (describing legislative history of the iden- R
tity theft clauses).
426. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 217–20 (1982), superseded by statute as recognized in Day
v. Sebelius, 376 F. Supp. 2d 1022 (D. Kan. 2005), aff’d sub nom. Day v. Bond, 500 F.3d 1127
(10th Cir. 2007).
427. See supra notes 34–148 and accompanying text (showing a cross-state comparison of R
name-change statutes).
428. See supra notes 326–34 and accompanying text (listing existing procedural safeguards R
against fraud).
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or fraud (e.g., drug felonies), from changing their legal names.429  It is
under inclusive because even if someone is convicted of a non-iden-
tity-theft crime involving dishonesty or fraud (e.g., passing bad
checks),430 that person would only be restricted from changing their
legal name for ten years, compared to the lifetime ban for people con-
victed of identity theft.431
Thus, even if Illinois’ interests in preventing fraudulent name
changes and keeping accurate criminal records are “compelling,” re-
stricting someone’s access to a legal name change for life—or even for
ten years—is not a “necessary” means of achieving those goals.  Illi-
nois’ criminal name-change restrictions fail under Equal Protection
strict scrutiny because the state’s interests in protecting the public
from fraud and sexual violence do not justify relegating an already
politically powerless group to a permanent second-class status.  The
right to determine one’s name free of governmental restrictions is sim-
ply too fundamental.
Alternatively, intermediate scrutiny could be applied to Illinois’
criminal name change restrictions and they would still violate the
Equal Protection Clause.  Names are a reflection of one’s inner iden-
tity—in particular, their gender identity.432  Names convey a person’s
gender to such an extent that a transgender person can be “outed” on
the basis of their legal name alone, regardless of their legal gender
marker as listed on their ID.433  When Illinois prohibits people with
certain criminal convictions from changing their legal names, the state
in effect, mandates the gender that person must present to their em-
ployer, school, and any other institution that must verify their iden-
tity.434  Therefore, Illinois’ name-change statute involves
classifications based on gender, and intermediate scrutiny would be
appropriate.435
Under intermediate scrutiny, the state has the burden of proving
that a statutory classification serves “important” government objec-
tives, and that the means employed are “substantially” related to
429. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/21-101 (2014).
430. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/17-1(B) (2014).
431. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/21-101.
432. See supra notes 335–47 and accompanying text (describing private interests in names and R
their role in gender expression).
433. See supra notes 1–8 and accompanying text (describing a common situation involving the R
hypothetical Tanya, a transgender woman who was denied food stamps on the basis of her iden-
tity document).
434. SPADE, supra note 20, at 144–45. R
435. SULLIVAN & FELDMAN, supra note 256, at 715 (noting that the Court applies intermedi- R
ate scrutiny to gender classifications).
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those objectives.436  If Illinois’ interests in its criminal name-change
restrictions would likely be considered “compelling” under strict scru-
tiny, they would also likely be considered “important” under interme-
diate scrutiny because it is a lower standard.437  However, the means
of achieving those objectives are not “substantially” related because
they are both over-inclusive and under-inclusive, as argued above.438
Further, the Court in United States v. Virginia noted that the men-
only military academy was the only institution of its kind in the state,
and the women-only alternative was inferior in terms of the quality of
education; on this basis, the state could not justify excluding women
from the academy.439  Similarly, the state of Illinois has the sole au-
thority over how people assume a new name, because in practice the
only way to assume a new name is by petitioning the court through the
established statutory scheme.440  Illinois cannot justify barring people
with certain convictions from the only means of changing their name
on the overbroad grounds that they might seek a fraudulent name
change or seek to avoid sex offender registration, because the name
change process already sufficiently protects against fraudulent name
changes without relying on criminal convictions.  Therefore, Illinois’
criminal name change restrictions are not “substantially” related to its
goals of preventing fraudulent name changes and keeping accurate
criminal records, and they fail under intermediate scrutiny.
While the Court has historically applied minimal scrutiny to classifi-
cations based on felony status, Illinois’ criminal name-change restric-
tions are distinguishable from that line of cases, and minimal scrutiny
analysis is not appropriate here.441  In Richardson, the Court recog-
nized that felon disenfranchisement laws directly and severely en-
croach upon the fundamental right to vote.442  However, the Court
applied minimal scrutiny and upheld the laws because the Fourteenth
Amendment expressly permits felon disenfranchisement.443  By con-
trast, the Constitution does not expressly permit states to restrict one’s
ability to name oneself on the basis of criminal convictions.444  In fact,
436. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
437. SULLIVAN & FELDMAN, supra note 256, at 715. R
438. See supra notes 427–31 and accompanying text. R
439. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
440. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/21-105 (2014) (“Common law name changes adopted in this State
on or after July 1, 2010 are invalid.”); see NAME CHANGE 101, supra note 58; see also TRANS- R
FORMATIVE JUSTICE LAW PROJECT OF ILL., CHANGING YOUR LEGAL NAME IN COOK COUNTY,
ILLINOIS, http://tjlp.org/services/online-resources/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2017).
441. See, e.g., Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 33 (1974).
442. Id. at 52, 54.
443. Id. at 54–56.
444. Kushner, supra note 37, at 348–49. R
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when the Fourteenth Amendment was framed, name-change statutes
did not exist yet; anyone could easily change their name via the com-
mon law tradition at the time, such restrictions would have sounded
completely alien to the framers of this Amendment.445  Therefore, the
reasoning from Richardson does not apply to Illinois’ criminal name
change restrictions, and minimal scrutiny is not an appropriate test of
their constitutionality.
Further, Illinois’ criminal name change restrictions are distin-
guished from other collateral consequence legislation to which courts
have applied minimal scrutiny.  The Court has traditionally applied
minimal scrutiny in this line of cases because it found no fundamental
right to employment, food, shelter, or government benefits.446  By
contrast, Illinois’ criminal name-change restrictions interfere with the
fundamental First Amendment right to name oneself,447 as well as the
fundamental right to vote.448  Courts have applied strict scrutiny to
statutory restrictions based on felony status when the law impinges
upon a fundamental right.449  Therefore, minimal scrutiny should not
be applied here.
Even if minimal scrutiny were applied to Illinois’ criminal name-
change restrictions, the restrictions fail the test because the means of
the law are not reasonably related to reasonable state interests.450
Some courts have invalidated criminal restrictions on employment
under minimal scrutiny when those restrictions “fail to recognize the
obvious differences in fitness and character,” such that the restriction
is not reasonably tailored to the required job skills and to the legisla-
tive goal of protecting “social and moral welfare.”451  For example, in
Schanuel v. Anderson, the Seventh Circuit upheld an Illinois state law
requiring people convicted of a “felony or crime of moral turpitude”
to wait ten years until they become eligible to work as armed security
guards, reasoning that the law rationally promotes social and moral
445. See supra notes 37–58 and accompanying text (describing common law tradition of R
changing one’s name and history of name-change statutes).
446. See supra notes 290–95 and accompanying text (listing other cases in which courts have R
upheld collateral consequences of convictions).
447. See supra notes 301–70and accompanying text (arguing name change restrictions impinge R
on fundamental First Amendment rights).
448. See supra notes 264–73 and accompanying text (arguing name change restrictions im- R
pinge on fundamental right to vote).
449. See, e.g., In re D.W., 827 N.E.2d 466, 481, 485 (Ill. 2005) (denying mother parental rights
based on criminal convictions triggered strict scrutiny because the family is deeply rooted).
450. Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 418, 24, 33 (1974); Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S.
483, 489 (1955).
451. See Schanuel v. Anderson, 708 F.2d 316, 320 (7th Cir. 1983) (citing Smith v. Fussenich,
440 F. Supp. 1077 (D. Conn. 1977)).
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welfare because the Act prevents potentially dangerous people from
accessing deadly weapons.452  Illinois’ blanket criminal name-change
restrictions do not allow courts to consider individual “fitness and
character” at all; even if it did, a person with a criminal conviction
cannot threaten “social and moral welfare” by using a valid, govern-
ment-issued ID that reflects a new legal name—particularly if police
agencies have records of the name change.453  If anything, carrying an
ID that accurately reflects one’s name and gender reduces the likeli-
hood of violence and confusion for society as a whole.454
Additionally, the means of this law are vastly under inclusive if the
purpose is to protect the public from fraud and from sex offenders.455
For example, a person changing their name by marriage or divorce
may, pursuant to Illinois’ Marriage and Dissolution Act, change their
name regardless of felony status.456  There is no reasonable basis upon
which to permanently bar a person with an identity theft or sex crime
conviction from adopting a new name that is more in line with their
actual identity, yet permit that same person to change their name for
the reason of marriage.457  A person with a sex crime or identity theft
conviction does not become less dangerous or more trustworthy sim-
ply because they are getting married.  Other collateral consequences
that courts have upheld under minimal scrutiny have not contained an
exception as arbitrary and attenuated as marriage, and therefore the
means of this law are not reasonably related to reasonable state inter-
ests.458  Further, the marriage exception offends the very core of the
Equal Protection Clause because it arbitrarily treats similarly situated
people differently.459
The Illinois criminal name-change restrictions fail under strict, in-
termediate, and minimal scrutiny Equal Protection analysis.  This law
encroaches upon the fundamental rights to self-definition and to ac-
cess certain resources and institutions needed to survive in the mod-
452. Id.
453. See supra notes 126–32 and accompanying text (describing Group B states). R
454. SPADE, supra note 20, 144–45; see GRANT ET AL., supra note 14, at 139 (discussing how R
incidents of violence are more likely when someone’s ID does not accurately reflect their name
and gender).
455. See supra notes 67–85 and accompanying text (describing legislative history of criminal R
name-change restrictions with regards to sex crime convictions).
456. Illinois Marriage & Dissolution Act, 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/413 (2014).
457. Id.
458. See Kushner, supra note 37, at 340. But see ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-906 (West, Westlaw R
through May 4, 2017 of the 2017 1st Extraordinary Sess.) (allowing people required to register as
sex offenders to change name for reason of marriage).
459. Goldberg, supra note 247, at 485. R
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ern world.460  Those who are impacted by these restrictions,
particularly transgender people of color, suffer egregious harms as a
result of being forced to keep names that do not reflect their true
identities.461  This is exactly the type of harm that the framers of the
Fourteenth Amendment intended to prevent when they wrote the
Equal Protection Clause, and the criminal name-change restrictions
must be abolished.462
D. Public Policy
Finally, the criminal name-change restrictions should be abolished
on public policy grounds.  In practice, these restrictions create incon-
sistencies with Illinois legislation that mitigates the negative collateral
consequences of criminal records.463  Further, they are a devastating
consequence of mass incarceration and must be abolished as part of a
larger goal of dismantling systems of criminalization.464
1. Practical Inconsistencies with Illinois Sealing Legislation
The first criminal restrictions were added to Illinois’ name-change
statute in the early 1990s, when Congress and state legislatures rou-
tinely passed “tough on crime” laws as a response to a perceived but
mythological increase in crime rates.465  Since then, circumstances in
Illinois have changed significantly and the criminal name-change re-
strictions are out of step with current Illinois laws.466  For example,
since the Illinois General Assembly passed the criminal name change
restrictions, Illinois has passed numerous expansions of sealing laws,
recognizing a need to mitigate the collateral consequences of criminal
convictions.467  A sealed criminal record does not appear on most
criminal background checks for employment, housing, and other pri-
vate institutions, which prevents discrimination on the basis of that
460. See also GRANT ET AL., supra note 14, at 5 (describing results of study in which trans- R
gender people reported discrimination and violence on the basis of identity documents).
461. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982), superseded by statute as recognized in Day v.
Sebelius, 376 F. Supp. 2d 1022 (D. Kan. 2005), aff’d sub nom. Day v. Bond, 500 F.3d 1127 (10th
Cir. 2007).
462. See Goldberg, supra note 247, at 485. R
463. Criminal Identification Act, 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. 2630/1 to /14 (2014).
464. See supra notes 151–91 and accompanying text (providing overview of mass R
incarceration).
465. See supra notes 164–70 and accompanying text (providing examples of tough on crime R
legislation).
466. See supra notes 114–48 and accompanying text (providing comparison of name change R
laws across all fifty states).
467. 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. 2630/5.2.
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record.468  The name-change felony wait period runs contrary to those
laws by continuing to punish people with felony convictions well after
they have completed their sentences, and in some cases, after they
have become eligible to seal that conviction.469
For example, consider a person who was convicted in 2015 of class-
four felony possession of marijuana: They are sentenced to the maxi-
mum of three years in prison, and then serve a subsequent sentence of
one year Mandatory Supervised Release, so the latest they would fin-
ish their sentence would be 2019.470  Provided that this person has not
been convicted of any more crimes, under the Illinois’ Criminal Iden-
tification Act this person would be eligible to seal that conviction four
years from the date of conviction, which in this example would be
2019.471  However, that same person would not be eligible to change
their legal name until ten years have elapsed from the termination of
their sentence, which in this example would be 2029, ten years after
they were eligible to seal the conviction.472  While the sealed convic-
tion may no longer appear on background checks, the same sealed
conviction would prevent that person from changing their name.
The purpose of sealing law is to mitigate the collateral conse-
quences of criminal convictions by not requiring people to disclose
their criminal history to potential employers, landlords, and others,
who may discriminate against them on that basis.473  More broadly,
sealing laws function to ensure that criminal convictions stop posing a
barrier to obtaining employment and housing at a certain point.474
The name-change felony wait period defeats that purpose because cer-
tain sealed convictions can continue to prevent transgender people
from obtaining housing, employment, and government benefits due to
discrimination on the basis of their legal name on identity
documents.475
The public interest in preventing discrimination and violence on the
basis of identity documents and mitigating the collateral consequences
of criminal convictions require of the abolition of Illinois’ criminal
name-change restrictions.  Sealing law recognizes the need to give
468. Id.
469. Id. (setting the maximum waiting period for sealing a felony conviction in Illinois at four
years from the date of conviction).
470. Cannabis Control Act, 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 550/5(c) (2014).
471. 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. 2630/5.2.
472. Id.
473. Id. §§ 1–14. See generally INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF
MASS INCARCERATION (Marc Mauer & Meda Chesney-Lind eds., 2002).
474. See INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT, supra note 473. R
475. QUICK GUIDE, supra note 20. R
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people second chances, and abolishing these restrictions would do just
that.
2. The Long-Term Necessity of Prison Abolition
Illinois’ criminal name-change restrictions are more than outdated
and inconsistent with sealing laws—they are part of the devastating
and unjust prison-industrial complex (PIC), and these restrictions
should be abolished as part of an effort to ultimately end mass incar-
ceration and criminalization of communities of color.476  This Com-
ment uses the term PIC to refer to the systems of laws and institutions
that drive mass incarceration, as well as the ideologies that see the use
of prisons and policing in the United States as a “solution” to social,
political, and economic problems such as poverty, violence, and dis-
crimination.477  The PIC also encompasses collateral consequences of
criminal convictions (like the name-change felony wait period),
human rights violations, the death penalty, private prisons, police,
courts, media, imprisonment of political prisoners, and the punish-
ment of lawful dissent.478
Illinois’ criminal name-change restrictions are only one of the many
ways in which the state systemically disempowers marginalized com-
munities through restrictions on what a person with a criminal record
can and cannot do.  In The New Jim Crow, Michelle Alexander, Asso-
ciate Professor of Law at Ohio State University, argues that all arenas
in which it is currently lawful to discriminate against a person on the
basis of their criminal record (e.g., housing, employment, etc.) mirror
the same arenas in which it was once lawful to discriminate on the
basis of race under Jim Crow laws.479  Because people of color are
disproportionately criminalized, and because businesses, landlords,
and schools can lawfully discriminate against applicants based on their
criminal records, Alexander argues that mass incarceration has func-
tionally replaced Jim Crow in the lives of poor communities of
color.480
Illinois’ criminal name-change restrictions cause the transgender
people who are subject to them to become vulnerable to transphobic
discrimination on the basis of their identity documents, in addition to
476. See supra notes 151–91 and accompanying text (providing an overview of mass R
incarceration).
477. See DAVIS, supra note 151, 84–104 (defining the prison-industrial complex); see also What R
Is the PIC? What Is Abolition?, CRITICAL RESISTANCE, http://criticalresistance.org/about/not-so-
common-language/ (last visited Aug. 12, 2016).
478. DAVIS, supra note 151, at 84–104; see What is the PIC?, supra note 477. R
479. ALEXANDER, supra note 163, at 55–58. R
480. Id.
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discrimination on the basis of their underlying conviction, in all the
arenas that Alexander discusses: housing, employment, education,
among others.481  In this way, Illinois’ criminal name-change restric-
tions are one face of the New Jim Crow, and must be abolished.
In the era of mass incarceration, it is imperative to link efforts to
abolish collateral consequence laws, like Illinois’ criminal name-
change restrictions, with a long term vision of completely abolishing—
not reforming—the PIC.482  Prison abolition is a movement that aims
to dismantle the PIC, and to build a world that has no need for pris-
ons, jails, immigrant detention centers, military, police, judges, states
attorneys, and parole officers.483  Abolitionists believe these institu-
tions have direct historical ties to chattel slavery and imperialism, and
are therefore inherently oppressive;484 therefore, the goal of abolition
is not to “replace” prisons and police with some equivalent form of
oppressive punishment or policing.485  Rather, the goal of abolition is
to build a world where prisons and police are obsolete by addressing
the root causes of violence and oppression in communities.486
Instead of reacting to violence and conflict with more police and
more prisons, which do not make society safer but rather cause more
violence and poverty,487 prison abolition begins with the fundamental
481. See SPADE, supra note 20, at 146–47. R
482. Compare DAVIS, supra note 151, at 106 (arguing that movements to end the death pen- R
alty must be linked with strategies for prison abolition because “[t]he death penalty has coex-
isted with the prison” since its inception; likewise, collateral consequences reinforce the PIC by
locking criminalized populations out of employment, housing, etc., which in many cases leads to
them committing crimes of survival and become reincarcerated. In this way, collateral conse-
quences and prisons are part of the same cycle, and efforts to abolish name change restrictions
must be informed by and support larger movements to abolish the PIC as a whole), with SPADE,
supra note 20, at 91 (stating that legal reform, by itself, is insufficient), and ANGELA DAVIS, R
ABOLITION DEMOCRACY: BEYOND EMPIRE, PRISONS, AND TORTURE 92 (2005) (“[T]he law can-
not on its own create justice and equality.”).
483. See DAVIS, supra note 151, at 107 (discussing alternatives to criminal punishment that R
could render the PIC obsolete).
484. See id. at 22–39, 56 (discussing historical ties between modern PIC and chattel slavery);
see also MOGUL ET AL., supra note 171, at 1–19 (discussing historical ties between modern PIC R
and colonialism); see also id. at 51–52 (noting that “Slave patrols were among the first state-
sponsored police forces in the United States” and arguing that “their purpose, targets, and tac-
tics have remained much the same.”).
485. DAVIS, supra note 151, at 107; see MOGUL ET AL., supra note 171, at 1–19, 51–52; William R
P. Quigley, Revolutionary Lawyering: Addressing the Root Causes of Poverty and Wealth, 20
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 101, 145 n.190 (2006) (arguing the PIC cannot be replaced with a single
alternative).
486. See SPADE, supra note 20, 196–197. R
487. See Sudbury, supra note 189, 15–16 (discussing how prisons cause violence against trans- R
gender people); see also JAMIE BISSONETTE, WHEN THE PRISONERS RAN WALPOLE: A TRUE
STORY IN THE MOVEMENT FOR PRISON ABOLITION 10 (2008) (arguing that prisons themselves
are a root cause of violence and therefore must be abolished); Todd Clear, The Effects of High
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question: Why do people cause harm in the first place, and how can
we prevent that harm?488  In contrast with the popular notion that
“criminals are bad people” who want to do harm, abolitionists believe
that most people are criminalized because they are poor and commit
certain crimes to survive, the root cause of which may be due to issues
with mental health or addiction, or because they are re-enacting vio-
lence that has been perpetrated against them.489  In this way, aboli-
tionists seek to humanize people with criminal backgrounds, and to
empower them by chipping away at punitive systems that make their
lives more unlivable.490  The ultimate goal of prison abolition is to
eliminate all of those punitive systems and instead respond to harm
with dialogue, healing, and restorative practices, and prevent harm in
the first place by instituting free high-quality education, mental health
and addiction treatment, community building and empowerment, uni-
versal healthcare, affordable housing and transportation, guaranteed
income for all, access to food and water, redistribution of wealth, rep-
arations, and more.491
Imprisonment Rates on Communities, 37 CRIME & JUST. 97, 117–23 (2008) (explaining that pris-
ons destabilize communities, cause more violence, and increase the chance of criminal behavior);
Sasha Abramsky, Toxic Persons, SLATE (Oct. 8, 2010, 7:34AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/
news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2010/10/toxic_persons.html (prisons contribute to systemic pov-
erty); James Hamblin, Mass Incarceration Is Making Infectious Diseases Worse, ATLANTIC (July
18, 2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2016/07/incarceration-and-infection/491321/
; Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor, Fewer Police, Safer Communities?, IN THESE TIMES (Nov. 10, 2015),
http://inthesetimes.com/article/18571/fewer-police-safer-communities (arguing that fewer police
would lead to less crime and violence); John Tierney, Prison and the Poverty Trap, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 18, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/19/science/long-prison-terms-eyed-as-contribut-
ing-to-poverty.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (discussing how prisons contribute to poverty); We
Can Have Safer Communities and Few People Behind Bars, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/in-
fographic/we-can-have-safer-communities-and-fewer-people-behind-bars (last visited Aug. 12,
2016) (providing examples of states that have decreased incarceration rates and as a result de-
creased the rates of violent and property crimes).
488. See Allegra M. McLeod, Prison Abolition and Grounded Justice, 62 UCLA L. REV. 1156,
1207–08 (2015) (prison abolition aims to displace criminal laws by focusing on root causes).
489. DAVIS, supra note 151, at 112–13 (explaining that everyone has broken the law at some R
point, but certain people are more likely to be arrested, incarcerated, and labeled a “criminal”
depending on their gender, race, and class); SPADE, supra note 20, 121–22 (arguing that people R
are more likely to commit crimes and be arrested if they live in a poor community or struggle
with untreated mental health problems); M. Glasser et. al., Cycle of Child Abuse: Links Between
Being a Victim and Becoming a Perpetrator, 179 BRITISH J. PSYCHIATRY 482, 488–91 (2001)
(experiencing sexual trauma increases the likelihood of perpetrating sexual violence).
490. Sudbury, supra note 189, at 14. R
491. Id.; see DAVIS, supra note 151, at 105–15; see also, e.g., Chyrsalis Collective, Beautiful, R
Difficult, Powerful: Ending Sexual Assault Through Transformative Justice, in THE REVOLUTION
STARTS AT HOME: CONFRONTING INTIMATE VIOLENCE WITHIN ACTIVIST COMMUNITIES
189–205 (Ching-In Chen et al. eds., 2011) (illustrating how healing and transformative practices
can address community violence without relying on the criminal legal system); Mychal Denzel
Smith, Abolish the Police. Instead, Let’s Have Full Social, Economic, and Political Equality, NA-
TION (Apr. 9, 2015), https://www.thenation.com/article/abolish-police-instead-lets-have-full-so-
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Until mass movements for prison abolition, led by non-lawyers,492
can build a world without prisons, police, and collateral consequences
of criminal convictions, lawyers can help reduce the harm of mass in-
carceration by practicing abolitionist lawyering.493  Abolitionist lawy-
ering means practicing law in ways that directly empower and support
those targeted by the PIC, without creating additional divisions be-
tween the perceived  “deserving and undeserving.”494  Abolitionist ac-
tivists differentiate between “reformist reforms” and “abolitionist
reforms.”495  Reformist reforms might make the PIC at least appear to
be less oppressive and more protective, while actually giving more re-
sources, legitimacy, and power to the system.496  By contrast, aboli-
cial-economic-and-political-equality/ (listing alternatives to the police); see also supra note 490 R
and accompanying text.
492. Quigley, supra note 486, at 144 n.187; see also Gabriel Arkles et al., The Role of Lawyers R
in Trans Liberation: Building a Transformative Movement for Social Change, 8 SEATTLE J. SOC.
JUST. 579, 594–607 (2010) (arguing that attorney leadership within social justice movements has
historically tended to de-radicalize the movements, undermine the leadership of those most di-
rectly impacted, and reinforce the status quo).  “The central limitation to attorney work for
social change is that typical tools of legal advocacy, such as direct services, impact litigation, and
lawyer-led advocacy for policy reform, do not, at their core, shift broader problems of misdis-
tribution of wealth and life chances in our culture.  Rather, these strategies can exacerbate those
power differences, reifying elite professionals as leaders.” Id.
493. See DAVIS, supra note 480, at 93 (arguing that lawyers must use the law as a tool for R
progressive change while recognizing the limits of the law); Sudbury, supra note 189, at 14 (link- R
ing reformist legal work to a broader struggle for prison abolition allows activists to meet the
needs of those impacted by the PIC while simultaneously challenging the legitimacy of the
system).
494. SPADE, supra note 20, at 92 (“In both prison and immigration reform contexts, trans- R
gender activists are raising concerns about the danger of dividing affected populations by mobil-
izing ideas about who constitutes a ‘deserving’ or ‘undeserving’ subject.”).
495. Liat Ben-Moshe, The Tension Between Abolition and Reform, ACADEMIA, http://
www.academia.edu/3483590/The_tension_between_abolition_and_reform (last visited Jan. 27,
2017).  The distinction between “reformist reforms” and “non-reformist reforms” originated
with French socialist Andre Gorz, who first defined the terms with reference to radical labor
organizing in his book STRATEGY FOR LABOR: A RADICAL PROPOSAL (1968).  Dr. Ruthie Gil-
more applied the distinction to debate between prison abolition versus prison reform in her
book THE STRUGGLE WITHIN: PRISONS, POLITICAL PRISONERS, AND MASS MOVEMENTS IN THE
UNITED STATES (2014).
496. SPADE, supra note 20, 91–92 (“Abolitionists caution that a system designed from its in- R
ception as a technology of racialized control through exile and punishment will use any rationale
necessary to achieve that purpose. . . .  [L]aw reform projects often provide rationales and justifi-
cations for the expansion of harmful systems.”); see also id. at 91 (“[Law reform work] merely
tinkers with systems to make them look more inclusive while leaving their most violent opera-
tions intact . . .”).  A commonly cited example of a reformist reform is hate crime legislation.
See, e.g., The Matthew Sheppard and James Byrd, Jr., Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2009, 18
U.S.C. § 249 (2012).  Abolitionists argue that these laws have not made life significantly safer for
LGBTQ people, and like most other criminal laws, have been used to incarcerate a dispropor-
tionate number of people of color. DEAN SPADE, Their Laws Will Never Make Us Safer, in
AGAINST EQUALITY: PRISONS WILL NOT PROTECT YOU 1–12 (Ryan Conrad ed., 2012); see also
SPADE, supra note 20, at 82, 87–88.  These reforms have strengthened the PIC because hate R
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tionist reforms make incremental changes with an eye toward
eventually creating a world without prisons, police, and collateral con-
sequences of criminalization—without transferring more power and
resources to the PIC.497
Abolishing Illinois’ criminal name-change restrictions would be an
abolitionist reform because it would transfer the power to name a per-
son away from the PIC and into the hands of the people whom it
marginalizes, including transgender people of color.498  Further, abol-
ishing the criminal name-change restrictions is oriented toward libera-
tion for all without creating divisions between who “deserves” to
change their legal name.499  For example, it would not be aligned with
abolition to argue that the Illinois criminal name-change restrictions
should be abolished because they primarily impact transgender people
who did not commit violent crimes, or sex-related crimes, or identity
theft crimes, or who were profiled by the police and did not commit
any crime at all.500  The argument that transgender people are not
“those criminals“ falsely assumes that transgender people are never
convicted of these crimes, and it also furthers the punitive ideology of
the PIC that people convicted of these crimes are “bad criminals” or
“predators” who do not deserve autonomy over their identities.501
The danger of litigation utilizing this non-abolitionist logic is that the
court may abolish the felony wait period, or create an exception, for
only transgender people to change their names, ultimately ignoring
crime laws rely on a racist system of policing and prosecution. Id.; see also SRLP on Hate Crime
Laws, SYLVIA RIVERA L. PROJECT, http://srlp.org/action/hate-crimes/ (last visited Jan. 27, 2017);
see also SPADE, supra note 20, 90–92. R
497. Sudbury, supra note 189, at 14.  An example of an abolitionist reform would be Chicago’s R
Reparations for Burge Torture Victims Ordinance, which secured financial reparations for the
dozens of Black men tortured by former Chicago Police Chief John Burge, and provides for a
trauma counseling center on the South Side, as well as free college tuition for the families of
torture survivors.  In these ways, this abolitionist reform aims to uplift entire communities di-
rectly and indirectly impacted by the PIC, without giving more funding or power to the system.
See Reparations for Burge Torture Victims, CITY OF CHI., http://www.cityofchicago.org/content/
dam/city/depts/dol/supp_info/Burge-Reparations-Information-Center/ORDINANCE.pdf (last
visited Jan. 27, 2017); see also Adeshina Emmanuel, Chicago Passes Ordinance Granting Repara-
tions to Police Torture Survivors, TRUTHOUT (May 7, 2015), http://www.truth-out.org/news/item/
30667-human-rights-practices-inform-chicago-ordinance-in-police-torture-case.
498. See SPADE, supra note 20, at 91, (“[Abolitionist activists] considering using law reform as R
a tool . . . have to be extraordinarily vigilant to determine if we are actually strengthening and
expanding various systems’ capacities to harm, or if our work is part of dismantling those
capacities.”).
499. Id. at 92.
500. Id.
501. Id. (“[C]ampaigns about imprisonment that only focus on people convicted of nonviolent
crimes . . . risk refining the system in ways that justify and legitimize the bulk of its continued
operation by eliminating its most obvious contradictions.”).
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the inherent problems in believing that the other condemned
demographics “get what they deserve.”502
This non-abolitionist logic furthers the oppressive functioning of the
PIC and must be rejected.  The notion of the “sexual predator” has
often been used to justify harsh criminal laws and collateral conse-
quences, as well as the expansion of the prison system in general.  The
misconception that incidents of sexual violence perpetrated by stran-
gers are on the rise furthers the false assumption that the majority of
people with criminal convictions are innately “bad” or “dangerous”
people incapable of transformation.503  This myth has contributed to
the expansion of the PIC because it justifies building more prisons,
passing more punitive laws, and militarizing the police—all without
investing in rehabilitation and institutions that actually prevent harm
to the community.504
This myth also contributed to Illinois’ adoption of its criminal
name-change restrictions.  Illinois’ criminal name-change restrictions
were enacted because the Illinois General Assembly assumed that
people convicted of felonies, sex crimes, and identity theft could only
want to change their legal names for nefarious purposes, (i.e., evading
the community notification requirement).505  The General Assembly
determined that the only way to deter these “bad people” from caus-
ing future harm would be to add another layer of punishment by
prohibiting them from changing their legal names.506  Intensifying the
collateral consequences of criminal convictions is misguided, oppres-
sive, and fundamentally at odds with prison abolition.507
Taking an abolitionist approach, even if a person with a criminal
conviction poses some danger to the community, that person is a
human and should still have the dignity and autonomy to determine
their own name.  They may have very legitimate reasons for wanting
to change their legal name; even if they are not transgender, perhaps
502. Id.
503. Wacquant, supra note 168, at 212 (“[T]he tally of rapes in the country recorded by the R
National Crime Victimization Survey reveals a stagnation at around 2.5 victims per 1,000 persons
age twelve or older from 1973 till 1988, followed by a steady decline until 1995 . . . just when the
furor over sex-related crimes peaked.”).
504. Id. at 214–16, 225 (arguing that the idea of the predator as an “incurable deviant” has
intensified criminal punishment and has “eroded if not buried” rehabilitation programs).
505. See supra notes 67–85 and accompanying text (discussing legislative history of criminal R
name-change restrictions that pertain to sex offenses).
506. Id.
507. See Collateral Consequences, SENT’G PROJECT, http://www.sentencingproject.org/issues/
collateral-consequences/ (last visited Jan. 27, 2017); see also Kevin Sali, ‘The Box,’ and Other
‘Collateral’ Consequences of Criminal Convictions, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 05, 2015, 12:06 PM)
(explaining the collateral consequences of criminal convictions).
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they feel that the name under which they were convicted no longer
represents who they are now.508  This is particularly true for those who
found religion post-conviction or during incarceration, and who want
to adopt a new name to reflect this new and profound change in their
identities.509  The criminal name-change restrictions symbolically keep
a person tethered to a name and identity that the state has labeled as
undesirable and criminal, and it is reasonable for that person to want
to evolve from that past self.510  Additionally, forcing that person to
maintain a name with which they do not identify for the rest of their
life—or even for ten years—is vastly disproportionate to whatever
harm they might have caused considering names are so central to
identity and autonomy.511  Finally, preventing that person from chang-
ing their legal name does not address the root causes behind why they
might have caused that harm—it is simply punishment for the sake of
punishment.512
Abolishing the criminal name-change restrictions would undermine
such punitive logic because anyone with a criminal conviction would
become eligible to change their legal names, and not just people who
may seem like more sympathetic figures.513  This requires an acknowl-
edgment that most people in the criminal legal system are not in fact
dangerous or innately bad, that they deserve a fundamental level of
508. See Hal Arkowitz & Scott Lillienfeld, Once a Sex Offender, Always a Sex Offender?
Maybe Not, SCI. AM. (Apr. 1, 2008), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/misunderstood-
crimes/ (“Sex offenders are not all fated to repeat their horrible crimes.”).
509. See STEPHANIE C. BODDIE ET. AL. RELIGION IN PRISONS: A 50-STATE SURVEY OF
PRISON CHAPLAINS 11 (2012), http://www.pewforum.org/2012/03/22/prison-chaplains-exec/ (dis-
cussing that according to national study interviewing prison chaplains, between 26% and 51% of
prisoners convert to a different religion while incarcerated, and a disproportionate number con-
vert to Islam); see also Nora Caplan-Bricker, Adam Gadahn, Muhammad Ali, Malcolm X: Why
Do Some Muslim Converts Change Their Whole Names and Others Only Part? SLATE (June 29,
2010), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/explainer/2010/06/
adam_gadahn_muhammad_ali_malcolm_x.html (“[T]he majority of Muslims who enter the faith
choose to alter their names to mark the beginning of a new chapter in their lives.”).
510. ALEXANDER, supra note 163, at 161–69 (discussing the stigma of living with a criminal R
conviction).
511. See supra notes 301–70 and accompanying text (discussing how names are a fundamental R
form of expression and identity formation).
512. Arkowitz, supra note 508; see also Girshick, supra note 188, at 119 (arguing that stricter R
punishments for sex offenders merely makes their lives more difficult without making communi-
ties safer).
513. See, e.g., Alex Bender & Sarah Crowley, Haunted by the Past: A Criminal Record
Shouldn’t Ruin a Career, ATLANTIC (Mar. 25, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/
archive/2015/03/haunted-by-the-past-a-criminal-record-shouldnt-ruin-a-career/388138/ (illustrat-
ing examples of “trustworthy job applicants” affected by their criminal past).
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dignity and autonomy, and they do not deserve to live under a state-
imposed “brand”—a legal name with which they do not identify.514
Abolishing the criminal name-change restrictions in Illinois’ name-
change statute support the goals of prison abolition because it elimi-
nates a component of the PIC, thereby helping criminalized people to
survive in a world in which collateral consequences of prior convic-
tions—the New Jim Crow—continue to be a reality they must pres-
ently live with.515  Further, abolishing all three criminal name-change
restrictions is aligned with prison abolition because it ensures that eve-
ryone whom this harmful law impacts is afforded the dignity and au-
tonomy they deserve.516  Eliminating these restrictions would be a
necessary and concrete step toward abolishing the PIC.
* * *
Illinois’ criminal name-change restrictions arbitrarily and substan-
tially interfere with the fundamental right to name oneself under the
First Amendment Freedom of Speech Clause,517 and they violate the
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.518  Further, Illinois’ criminal name-change restrictions are in-
consistent with Illinois sealing law, other states’ name-change laws,
and the necessary goals of prison abolition.519  The U.S. Constitution
and logical public policy rooted in the principles contained therein re-
quire abolishing these restrictions.
IV. IMPACT
The abolition of the Illinois criminal name-change restrictions
would go largely unnoticed by the majority of Illinois residents.  Not
many people are aware that this law exists, in part because only a very
small percentage of the population ever changes their legal names,
and only a fraction of that group is subject to the felony wait period or
permanent bars.520  However, for those to whom this law is relevant—
514. See supra notes 301–70 and accompanying text (arguing that names are central to dignity R
and autonomy).
515. See Sudbury, supra note 189, at 14. R
516. See SPADE, supra note 20, at 115. R
517. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
518. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
519. See supra notes 463–519 and accompanying text (discussing public policy reasons to abol- R
ish the restrictions).
520. For an estimate of transgender Illinoisans subject to the name change felony wait period,
see supra note 16 and accompanying text.  That estimate does not include cisgender people who R
want to change their legal names but who are subject to the wait period, but that number may be
relatively small in comparison. But see McClatchey, Why Are More People Changing Their
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including transgender people and people fleeing violent situations—
abolishing the name-change criminal bars would have an enormously
beneficial impact on their quality of life.521  Further, eliminating the
felony criminal name-change restrictions may improve overall com-
munity safety.522
A. Gender-Affirming Names and Safety for Transgender People
If the criminal name-change restrictions were abolished from Illi-
nois’ name-change statute, potentially thousands of transgender peo-
ple in Illinois would suddenly become eligible to change their legal
names.523  On a psychological level, all of those people would feel the
benefits of having a legal name that reflects their true gender identi-
ties.524  For many transgender people, choosing a name that conforms
with the gender with which one identifies is a literal act of identity-
formation, and this is often the first step that transgender people take
in their transition from one gender to another.525  Particularly in the
beginning stages, transitioning genders can be full of self-doubt, fears,
and hesitation, which in extreme cases may escalate to deciding not to
transition, or even to suicide.526
The numerous medical, legal, and social barriers to transitioning—
including prohibitively expensive medical treatment, the criminal
name-change restrictions, pushback from family and friends, getting
fired from one’s job, and more—often exacerbate those doubts and
risk of suicide.527  The fewer barriers and stigma a transgender person
faces in transitioning, and the more external validation that they re-
ceive from individuals and institutions, the more likely that trans-
Name?, BBC NEWS (Oct. 18, 2011), http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-15333140 (indicating
that recent years have seen a rise in people changing their legal names for non-marriage-related
reasons, but the number of people seeking to change their legal names remains relatively small).
521. See infra notes 523–544 and accompanying text. R
522. See supra notes 545–51 and accompanying text. R
523. See supra note 16 (estimating the number of transgender people impacted by criminal R
name-change restrictions).
524. See supra notes 335–47 and accompanying text (discussing private interests in name R
changes).
525. TRANSGENDER 101, supra note 9. R
526. Id.
527. See Kristen Clements-Nolle et al., Attempted Suicide Among Transgender Persons: The
Influence of Gender-Based Discrimination and Victimization, 51 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 53, 53–69
(2006); see also ANN P. HASS ET AL., WILLIAMS INST., SUICIDE ATTEMPTS AMONG TRANS-
GENDER AND GENDER NON-CONFORMING ADULTS (2014), http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/
wp-content/uploads/AFSP-Williams-Suicide-Report-Final.pdf (finding that 41% of transgender
people have attempted suicide at some point in their lives, compared to 4.6% of the general U.S.
population, and 50–78% of transgender people who have suffered discrimination, harassment, or
violence at work or at school have attempted suicide).
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gender person will be able to survive and flourish as their true self.528
Simply having government-issued identity documents that reflect
one’s name is one example of a seemingly small validation of identity
that can have a profoundly affirming effect, showing a transgender
person that it is okay to transition and take on a different name.529
Similarly, those people would be given an opportunity to move be-
yond their past criminal convictions and all of the traumatic memories
attached to them.530  This is particularly true for those who have al-
ready been able to seal their convictions, but for whom the name-
change felony wait period continues to punish for the same predicate
felony.  Many of the people impacted by the criminal name-change
restrictions may be prohibited from changing their legal names based
on convictions that are over a decade old.  After that much time, a
person might have changed much more than their gender; they may
have found employment, stopped engaging in criminalized behavior,
or simply matured in such a way that the convictions of their past no
longer reflect who they are now.531  Living with the collateral conse-
quences of a traumatic period of one’s life is not only unjust, but it can
also have profoundly negative psychological consequences.532  The Il-
linois criminal name-change restrictions force thousands of trans-
gender people to remain tethered to a past that may no longer reflect
who they are today, and abolishing the restrictions would allow them
a new path forward by eliminating one collateral consequence of their
prior conviction.533
On a societal level, abolishing the criminal name-change restrictions
would help reduce incidents of violence and discrimination that trans-
gender people experience.534  Transgender people who are unable to
change their legal names are often subjected to harassment when they
are forced to present their government issued ID.535  Abolishing the
528. HASS ET AL., supra note 527. R
529. Id.
530. See Living with a Record: How Past Crimes May Drive Job Seekers Into Poverty, PBS
NEWS HOUR (Jan. 24, 2015), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/living-record-past-crimes-driving-
job-seekers-poverty/ (interview of Ronald Lewis conducted by Stephen Fee); see also Kai
Wright, Boxed In: How a Criminal Record Keeps You Unemployed for Life, NATION (Nov. 6,
2013), http://www.thenation.com/article/boxed-how-criminal-record-keeps-you-unemployed-life/
(describing the persistent feelings of dejection, failure, and hopelessness often associated with
having a criminal conviction).
531. ALEXANDER, supra note 163, at 161–69 (discussing the stigma of living with a criminal R
conviction).
532. Id.
533. See supra note 16 and accompanying text (estimating the number of transgender people R
impacted by criminal name-change restrictions).
534. See GRANT ET AL., supra note 14, at 5. R
535. Id.
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criminal name-change restrictions would decrease the risk of these in-
teractions, which can escalate into violence or death.536
Likewise, transgender people who are prohibited from changing
their legal names are more vulnerable to discrimination by employers,
schools, airports, and other institutions that require verification of
identity using a government-issued ID.537  While the criminal name-
change restrictions do not preclude transgender people from changing
their legal gender markers on their ID’s, they can still be outed be-
cause names generally carry either masculine or feminine connota-
tions.538  Being outed can lead to loss of employment, denial of
employment in the first place, dropping out of school, denial of hous-
ing, and more negative implications.539  Abolishing the Illinois crimi-
nal name-change restrictions would therefore likely increase rates of
employment and formal education among transgender people, leading
to decreased rates of poverty.540
With employment and housing rates up and rates of violence and
poverty down, Illinois could also expect to see a drop in incarceration
rates of transgender people as the cycles of poverty and incarceration
break.541  Many transgender people obtain the convictions that bar
them from changing their legal names because they were engaging in
survival crimes like retail theft or sex work, into which they were
forced because they were not able to obtain legitimate work due to
transphobic discrimination.542  In this way, poverty and criminaliza-
tion become part of the same cycle for many transgender people.543
Preventing opportunities for discrimination on the basis of identity
documents would undoubtedly help break this vicious and unfair cycle
in the lives of many transgender people in Illinois.544
B. A New Life for Survivors of Domestic Violence
Eliminating the Illinois criminal name-change restrictions could also
have positive consequences for people fleeing violent situations, in-
cluding survivors of domestic violence.  People change their legal
names for a variety of legitimate, non-fraudulent reasons other than
536. Id.
537. Id.
538. Id.
539. Id. at 52.
540. See GRANT ET AL., supra note 14, at 5, 23. R
541. See QUICK GUIDE, supra note 17; see also SYSTEMS OF INEQUALITY, supra note 175. R
542. See supra notes 151–93 and accompanying text (describing how transgender people of R
color are disproportionately criminalized).
543. See SYSTEMS OF INEQUALITY, supra note 175. R
544. Id.
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gender transition or marriage.545  For people who need to escape do-
mestic violence and abusive relationships, a new legal name could
help shield that person from their former abuser or stalker by making
the survivor more difficult to find.546  The Social Security Administra-
tion (SSA) even offers a process whereby survivors of domestic vio-
lence may obtain a new Social Security number, and along with the
Department of Justice, the SSA explicitly recommends a legal name
change as a safety precaution.547  However, the SSA is only able to
change a legal name within their records by court order, which survi-
vors in Illinois subject to the criminal name-change restrictions cannot
obtain.548  Abolishing Illinois’ criminal name-change restrictions
would mean that survivors of domestic violence could obtain the court
order that they need in order to obtain a new name, new Social Secur-
ity number, and new life.549
Further, survivors of domestic violence are often criminalized them-
selves.  For example, due to racist policing practices, Black women
who call the police during an incident of intimate partner violence are
often arrested instead of the person attacking them.550  In this way,
surviving a situation involving intimate partner abuse can itself lead to
a conviction that subjects someone to a name-change criminal restric-
tion, and that restriction in turn can further prolong the violent situa-
tion by prohibiting that person from changing their legal name.551  If
the criminal name-change restrictions are abolished, survivors of do-
mestic violence would have a needed avenue for escaping the people
545. Kushner, supra note 37, at 355. R
546. The Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act does not bar a person with a
felony conviction from changing their legal name for reasons of divorce, meaning that someone
who wishes to flee an abusive partner by changing their legal name and divorcing that partner
would be permitted to do so. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/413 (2014).  However, people with
felony convictions who need to escape from an abusive partner to whom they are not married
would be subject to the felony name change wait period.
547. SSA Provides Assistance to Victims of Domestic Violence, SOC. SECURITY ADMIN., https:/
/www.ssa.gov/pressoffice/domestic_fact.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2017) (“In addition to changing
your name, you should consider getting an unlisted telephone number, changing jobs, and mov-
ing to a new area/state.”).
548. SOC. SEC. ADMIN., NEW NUMBERS FOR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE VICTIMS, https://
www.ssa.gov/pubs/EN-05-10093.pdf (last visited Jan. 27, 2017).
549. Id.
550. Tasasha Henderson, Black Domestic Violence Survivors Are Criminalized from All Di-
rections, TRUTHOUT (June 4, 2015), http://www.truth-out.org/news/item/31178-black-domestic-vi-
olence-survivors-are-criminalized-from-all-directions; Law Enforcement Violence Against
Women of Color & Trans People of Color: A Critical Intersection of Gender Violence & State
Violence, INCITE!, http://www.incite-national.org/page/stop-law-enforcement-violence-toolkit
(last visited Jan. 27, 2017).
551. Id.
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who abuse them, and would be able to move forward from traumatic
criminal convictions.
C. Sex Offender Registration and Community Safety
Because Illinois primarily adopted its criminal name-change restric-
tions due to the perceived dangers that people convicted of sex of-
fenses posed to the community, it is reasonable to ask what impact
abolishing these restrictions would have on sex offenders and commu-
nity safety.552  Overall, the effect would likely be minimal, and poten-
tially even positive.
Abolishing the Illinois criminal name-change restrictions would not
put the public at greater risk of sexual violence.  One study estimates
that nationally, one in six people convicted of sex offenses illegally
manipulate their names, birthdays, and Social Security numbers to
avoid registration requirements,553 however the Illinois Attorney
General reports that ninety-three percent, a much higher percentage
than the national average, of sex offenders are compliant with regis-
tration requirements.554  Regardless of which statistic is more accu-
rate, eliminating Illinois’ criminal name-change restrictions would
probably not alter this percentage because people who want to take
advantage of gaps in enforcement would continue to do so and risk
punishment, and those who seek lawful name changes would still be
required to register.555  If anything, providing these people with a le-
gal avenue for changing their names could prevent them from avoid-
ing registration by helping the state better regulate the name-change
process (e.g., by sending notice to the Registry).556
Further, even people who seek to change their names to avoid re-
gistration would not pose a danger to the community if these restric-
tions are abolished.  Many people are required to register as a sex
offender for a variety of isolated, non-violent circumstances: from
552. See supra notes 37–58 and accompanying text (describing historical evolution of Illinois’ R
criminal name-change restrictions).
553. One in Six Sex Offenders Change Names to Avoid Registration: Study, HUFFINGTON POST
(July 26, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/07/25/sex-offenders-change-identity-
study_n_1703282.html.
554. Keeping Communities Safe, ILL. ATT’Y GEN. (2010), http://www.illinoisattorneygeneral.
gov/communities/somb/registry.html.
555. See Heather Hope, Bill Proposed to Thwart OK Sex Offenders from Changing Name,
NEWSON6 (Feb. 27, 2014, 5:57 PM), http://www.newson6.com/story/24845328/bill-proposed-to-
thwart-ok-sex-offenders-from-changing-name (“Obviously, we don’t want sex offenders driving
school buses, but [criminal name-change restrictions don’t] fix it. If a person illegally changes
their name, there’s already a penalty for that.”).
556. See supra notes 114–48 and accompanying text (listing ways in which other states regu- R
late legal name change process without the use of criminal restrictions).
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public urination to sex between a seventeen and sixteen year old.557
Further, while the general public believes that 75% of sex offenders
will reoffend, sex offenses actually have the lowest recidivism rate out
of any crime, at 14% compared to a 76.6% recidivism rate for all of-
fenses, and 63% recidivism rate for non-sex crimes.558  A very small
percentage of sex offenders have any history of assaulting or abduct-
ing people that they do not know: about 90% of sex offenses against
children and 75% of sex offenses against adult women are actually
committed by a family member, partner, or someone known to the
survivor.559  Based on these statistics, measures like the Sex Offender
Registry—which are designed to protect the community from stran-
gers—do very little to make the community safer, and may even make
communities less safe by furthering the misconception that strangers
are the primary threat to women and children.560  Therefore, people
who are required to register would not pose a danger to the commu-
nity if they are permitted to obtain a lawful name change.
In fact, posting names, addresses and photographs on a sex offender
registry can lead to destructive consequences for people labeled as
predators—and for the community as a whole.561  Since the passage of
community notification laws, countless people convicted of sex of-
fenses, and in some cases their families have lost their homes, jobs,
and support systems, which in some cases can lead to suicide.562  Some
have been subjected to regular verbal harassment, banishment, beat-
557. See Kevin McDermott, Illinois, Missouri on Opposite Sides of Sex Offender List Debate,
ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Apr. 16, 2012), http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/govt-and-politics/
illinois-missouri-on-opposite-ends-of-sex-offender-list-debate/article_2f7175bc-ca92-5f55-b5c7-
90c15d3ccc7d.html; see also Erin Fuchs, 7 Surprising Things that Could Make You a Sex Of-
fender, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 9, 2013), http://www.businessinsider.com/surprising-things-that-could-
make-you-a-sex-offender-2013-10.
558. Arkowitz, supra note 508; Matthew R. Durose et al. Recidivism of Prisoners Released in R
30 States in 2005: Patterns from 2005 to 2010, BUREAU JUST. STATS. (Apr. 22, 2014), http://
www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=PBdetail&iid=4986; Myths and Facts About Sex Offenders, CTR. FOR
SEX OFFENDER MGMNT. (Aug. 2000), http://www.csom.org/pubs/mythsfacts.html.
559. See Myths and Facts About Sex Offenders, supra note 558; Raising Awareness About Sex- R
ual Abuse–Facts and Statistics, NAT’L SEX OFFENDER PUB. WEBSITE, https://www.nsopw.gov/en-
US/Education/FactsStatistics?AspxAutoDetectCookieSupport=1 (last visited Jan. 17, 2017).
560. Paul Heroux, Sex Offenders: Recidivism, Re-Entry Policy and Facts, HUFFINGTON POST
(Nov. 8, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/paul-heroux/sex-offenders-recidi-
vism_b_976765.html; see also Wacquant, supra note 168, at 227–28 (“Knowing that a ‘sexual R
predator’ resides on the corner of such-and-such street does no more to reduce the chance of an
offense than knowing that drunk drivers are more likely to be on the road at night decreases the
chances of having a traffic accident in the afternoon . . . .  [Registries] ‘may actually increase the
risk to children to the degree that it lowers parental vigilance in monitoring the child’s contacts
with friends, relatives, and other trusted persons.’”).
561. Wacquant, supra note 168, at 223 (describing how sex offenders are frequently harassed, R
humiliated, insulted, and threatened).
562. Id.
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ings, or have even been murdered.563  Unnecessary punitive measures
like name-change restrictions and the Sex Offender Registry not only
stigmatize and brand a person—sometimes for life—but they make
them vulnerable to harassment and violence.564  While abolishing Illi-
nois’ criminal name-change restrictions would not remove the regis-
tration requirement, it would be one step toward truly inclusive
community safety for all, including people convicted of sex offenses.
Further, eliminating these restrictions could have rehabilitative ef-
fects for people convicted of sex offenses, which would make commu-
nities safer.  The Illinois criminal name-change restrictions
symbolically keep a person tethered to a name and identity that the
state has labeled as undesirable and criminal, and it is reasonable for
that person to want to evolve from that past self.565  Studies have
shown that addressing sexual violence with rehabilitation, like cogni-
tive-behavioral therapy and relapse prevention, more effectively com-
bats recidivism than retributive punishments.566  Dehumanizing
someone as if they will “always be a predator” only discourages them
from becoming a positive member of the community.567  Returning
autonomy and human dignity to that person in the form of their legal
name—even if they are still required to register with law enforce-
ment—would contribute to their rehabilitation and promote commu-
nity safety.568
V. CONCLUSION
Illinois’ criminal name-change restrictions violate the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause, the Fourteenth Amendment Equal
Protection Clause, the First Amendment Freedom of Speech Clause,
and they are not sound government policy.  They are not rationally
related to serving any rational or compelling state interest, and even if
they are, that state interest is substantially outweighed by the massive
amounts of violence and discrimination transgender people face as a
result of living with a name that does not reflect their true gender
identity.  This law is also outdated, creates practical inconsistencies
563. Id.; see, e.g., Lexi Pandell, The Vigilante of Clallam County, ATLANTIC (Dec. 4, 2013),
http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/12/the-vigilante-of-clallam-county/281968/ (dis-
cussing the vigilante who killed people on the sex offender registry).
564. Pandell, supra note 563. R
565. See ALEXANDER, supra note 163, at 161–69 (describing the stigma of living with a crimi- R
nal conviction).
566. Heroux, supra note 560; see also Arkowitz, supra note 508. R
567. Arkowitz, supra note 508. R
568. See BISSONETTE supra note 487, at 10–12 (examples of programs that grant more auton- R
omy to prisoners and thereby reduce incidents of violence).
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with Illinois sealing law, and it is out of step with the vast majority of
other states.  Further, they are part of the insidious prison-industrial
complex, and eliminating them would move the world one step closer
to the necessary goal of prison abolition.
If the criminal restrictions are abolished from the Illinois name-
change statute, it would likely contribute to the flourishing of trans-
gender people in Illinois.  Potentially six thousand transgender people
in Illinois are impacted by these restrictions.569  In the age of mass
incarceration and The War on Terror, government issued identity doc-
uments have become the keys to education, employment, government
benefits, travel, voting, and other resources needed to survive.570
Abolishing the felony criminal name-change restrictions could lead to
lower rates of violence and discrimination against transgender people
on the basis of identity documents, which would mean higher rates of
employment and formal education.  On an individual level, the ability
to change a legal name would have deep implications for improved
psychological well-being and mental health among transgender peo-
ple.  Additionally, abolishing the restrictions would help survivors of
domestic violence escape those who abuse them.
Names go to the heart of self-expression, autonomy, and identity.
Abolishing Illinois’ criminal name-change restrictions is necessary to
ensure that transgender people and all others who want to change
their legal names are afforded the safety, support, and resources that
they deserve.571
Lark Mulligan*
569. See supra note 16 (estimate of transgender people impacted by criminal name-change R
restrictions).
570. See Spade, supra note 17, at 738. R
571. See Ainsworth & Spiegel, Quality of Life of Individuals with and Without Facial Femini-
zation Surgery or Gender Reassignment Surgery, 19 QUALITY LIFE RES. 1019–24 (2010) (sug-
gesting that when transgender people are afforded the same treatment and access to resources as
cisgender people, free of transphobic discrimination, their risk of suicide dramatically drops to a
rate similar to that of the general population).
* Lark Mulligan, J.D. Candidate, 2017.  Special thank you to Virginia Macias Gorostiaga and
the many law student staffers who spent countless hours over the course of several months cite-
checking and editing this long Comment.  Thank you also to my colleagues at the Transformative
Justice Law Project of Illinois for helping me construct my arguments, reading multiple drafts,
and providing creative input.  Thank you to the ACLU of Illinois for the assistance in research-
ing state name change laws.  Most importantly, thank you to the many transgender name change
petitioners who have helped me understand the impact of these criminal name-change restric-
tions, and who graciously allowed me to draw upon their personal experiences in writing this
Comment.
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APPENDIX A
NAME CHANGE LAWS BY STATE
GROUP A GROUP B GROUP C
Name change petitioners Name change petitioners Name change petitioners
are not required to must disclose criminal must disclose criminal
disclose criminal history. record.  Judges are record.  Criminal
Judges are not required to required to consider convictions initiate a
consider criminal history in convictions in name mandatory waiting period
name change proceedings. change proceedings, but or permanent bar.
convictions do not initiate
a mandatory waiting
period or permanent bar.
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